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Abstract
Security verification for the physical implementation of a cryptography system is an
important step to ensure the security level promised by theory. As has been shown many
times, any physical device has characteristics and behavior that deviate from theoretical
expectations. Frequently, those lead to new security loopholes.
This thesis presents three experimental studies of attacks on quantum key distribution
(QKD) systems. The first is the detection efficiency mismatch on free-space systems,
which takes advantage of alignment imperfections in Bob’s detector to control detection
efficiencies. The experiment was done on a polarization-encoding free-space receiver to find
the detection efficiencies of each detector for different spatial modes of an incoming photon.
Those results were put into an optimization program, which modeled an intercept-and-
resend attack on a non-decoy Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. The result shows
that an adversary is able to gain information about the key without being detected by
Alice and Bob. The second study is an experimental test of reliability of a spatial filter
(a pinhole), which is proposed as a countermeasure for the previous attack. The result
shows that, by sending a high-power laser beam focused on the pinhole, the pinhole can be
widened without affecting other components in the receiver. Thus, the ability to perform
a spatial mode detection efficiency-mismatch attack is recovered. The last experiment is a
demonstration of Eve’s ability to force a commercial system to distill a key from a raw key
of a short length, where the asymptotic assumption of security claimed by the manufacturer
might not hold. It was shown that this could be done by inducing transmission loss in the
channel at an appropriate time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis has been written for two main purposes. First is to be a record of my research
over my master degree study. Second purpose is to provide an overview of this field of
study and be a guideline for new students who are interested but are not familiar with
quantum cryptography especially in practical Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).
The goal of this introduction section is to give an overview on cryptography. We
will start by emphasizing the importance and advantages of using encryption in secure
communication. Then, we will discuss about the necessity of QKD system. Lastly, we will
discuss about the importance of the verification of implementation of QKD.
Chapter 2 will be a review of security analysis of the QKD protocol. The chapter will
start with a formal security definition of QKD. Next, we will look at Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) as an example of QKD protocols. The last part will be a discussion on how
to justify the security of QKD protocol in practice.
Chapter 3 is about the implementation of QKD. In this chapter, we will discuss about
various observations about the behavior of the real-life apparatus that affect the security
of the QKD system and how to overcome them.
Chapter 4 contains the experimental process and the results of the verification of prac-
tical implementation of QKD both on a free-space system and on a fiber based system.
1.1 Secure communication in everyday life
At first glance secure communication might sound like a topic for specialists that has
no direct effect on everyday life. In contrast, there are a lot of our activities that rely
1
on secure communication: e-mail, ATM machine, online banking, software download and
update, etc. To guarantee the security of these activities, there are many considerations
to take into account [1]. For example, in software update, the software needs to make
sure that the client’s PC is getting data from the legitimate server, not a malicious entity
or virus distributor [2]. This so called ‘authentication’ process can be done by exchange
and verifying a code called ‘signature’, prior to the authentication. This signature has a
property that it is hard to forge by third party and the user can verify its legitimacy using
the algorithm, usually, embedded in the program they want to update. Another example is
e-mail or online private messaging [1, 3]. Both sender and receiver need to make sure that
no third party can read the message without their permission. The method that widely
used nowadays is public key encryption which rely on an assumption that factorization of
a large number is hard for those who has limited computational power [4]. A method to
avoid that assumption is using another scheme called one-time-pad [5]. In this scheme two
parties secretly shared a set of pre-exchanged string or ‘secret key’ and use that key to
encrypt the message. We will see later in this chapter that the encrypted message is secure
so long as the third party does not know about the key. The trade-off of this scheme is
that the key has to be as long as the message itself and the key cannot be reused.
Though, those keys can be exchanged in secret and store before the encryption, some
other communications need to encrypt large amount of data, happen at long distance, or
require a higher security level that cannot rely on the ‘key storage’. Thus, the requirement
of generation and exchange of secret key on demand has emerged. This generation and
exchange of secret key between two distant parties is called ‘key distribution’. The following
sections will be a formal statement of ‘security’ in the communication, and why security
of a secret key is a factor to determine the security of the communication.
1.2 Cryptography and security of cryptosystem
Thinking about cryptography, one might believe that perfect secrecy can be achieved only
by keeping the methods and the scheme hidden from the outside world. In contrast,
modern cryptography assumes that an adversary –often called eavesdropper or Eve– is
familiar with all the device used in the cryptosystem and has full knowledge of the protocol
– the processes used to generate and distribute the key. This assumption also known as
Kerckhoffs’s principle [6]. Eve also knows all the possible messages that might be used.
With that in mind, the security of a cryptosystem is defined as follows 1
1The following contents in this section are summarized from [7, 8, 9].
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Definition 1.2.1. Let M be a set of all possible messages, C is a set of all possible cryp-
togram or encrypted messages which might transmitted through the public channel. A cryp-
tosystem is perfectly secure if
p(M) = p(M |C) ∀M ∈M and ∀C ∈ C (1.1)
where p(M) is a priori probability distribution of message and p(M |C) is a posterio prob-
ability distribution of the message as viewed by Eve after learning about C.
In other words, Eve does not gain additional information about the message from the
cryptogram. This can be achieved with an encryption scheme called one-time pad. [5]
One-time pad is a scheme in which two parties – often called Alice and Bob – encrypt
and decrypt the message using a share secret key. Without loss of generality, the set of
messages M can be defined as a binary string of length m, M = {0, 1}⊕m and the set
of all possible keys K = {0, 1}⊕m where the key K was picked randomly with probability
p(K) = 1
2m
. The one-time-pad scheme works as follows:
Alice and Bob exchange the key K beforehand; in secret.
Alice obtains the encrypted message C by the message by perform bit-wise XOR be-
tween message M and key K,
C = M ⊕K. (1.2)
The encrypted message is sent to Bob via a public channel where Eve can take a copy of it.
After receiving C, Bob applies a bit-wise XOR between his key and the encrypted message
C. If there is no error in the channel, Bob will get
MBob = K ⊕ C = K ⊕K ⊕M = M. (1.3)
From here, it can be easily shown that for any message M,M ′ ∈ K and key K ∈ K
such that M ⊕ K = C there exist K ′ = M ′ ⊕ M ⊕ K ∈ K such that M ′ ⊕ K ′ = C.
This means that by learning, C, Eve’s chance to ‘guess’ the right message, M, is equal to
the probability that the key K would be selected. In the other words, the security of the
cryptosystem is as high as the security of the key itself.
An advantage of using key distribution and sending the encrypted message via a public
channel over other secret communication methods is that it allows the protocol to abort in
the middle of the key exchange without leaking any critical information about the message.
Both parties can stop and restart their protocol as many time as necessary until they are
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certain that they got a secure key. The next challenge is, since modern cryptography needs
to support long communication, how can Alice and Bob exchange their secret key without
meeting each other in person? For that, many schemes and protocols for ‘Key Distribution’
have been developed.
1.3 Why QKD?
To fulfill the need of key distribution, many schemes have been introduced, many theories
and claims have been put to test, many trial-and-error processes have been done. Even-
tually, criteria of security that are widely accepted have emerged. Classical cryptography
assumed that any adversary has limited computation power, the key is secure if the adver-
sary takes longer time, on average, on their calculation to decrypt the key than the lifetime
of the cryptogram. An example of key distribution protocol that relies on this assumption
is RSA introduced in 1978 [3]. RSA is a key distribution method based on the problem
of factorization of a large number. This problem is considered to be a hard problem to
solve in mathematics since the calculation steps of the most effective known factorization
protocol in classical computer is an exponential function of a number of bits of that large
number [4]. This algorithm is widely being used until today.
During the last century, our understanding of quantum phenomena has been rapidly
developed. Many applications of this knowledge have also been developed. An application
of the knowledge of the quantum world is Quantum Computing, a new paradigm of com-
puting that uses quantum states as register bits (widely called quantum bits or qubits)
and quantum operations and measurements to manipulate and read those states in order
to simulate the classical computing. A quantum algorithm that challenged and shook the
foundation of classical security was introduced in 1994: Peter Shor has introduced an algo-
rithm using qubits and quantum operations to solve the factorization problem [10]. This
algorithm can factorize a number with polynomial steps of calculation as compare to the
exponential steps achieved by the best classical algorithm. This, when implemented, has
a potential to break any RSA code with significantly shorter time than expected.
One of the solutions to the mathematical assumption above is to find a mathematical
problem and encryption scheme that is also hard-to-solve with any quantum algorithm.
For that the study of post-quantum cryptography was born. Another solution and the
main topic of this thesis is, instead of relying on hard-to-solved a mathematical problem;
the security criteria should rely on law of physics and mathematical proof, which is almost
impossible to defy or break. This is the beginning of Quantum Key Distribution or QKD.
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The conceptually motivations, and development of security proof shall be discussed in the
next chapter.
1.4 Hacking: verification of practical systems
As we have already seen throughout last decade, many cryptographic schemes experienced
many unexpected behaviors of the physical device that cause protocols unable to work as
proposed in theory. Worst, some of those behaviors open a loophole or side channel for
Eve or hackers to sneak in and take advantage of it. The developers needed to fix their
program or developed a new hardware to close those loopholes while hackers continue to
seek unknown loopholes in the patched system and so on. This presumably unending loop
of attacking and patching, in turn, drove the development of classical communications to
the level of security we have today.
Throughout the last decade, the concept and understanding of Quantum phenomena
and QKD systems have been rapidly developed. A lot of schemes and protocol have been
introduced. Many proof-of-concept experiments have been realized, some developed to be
fully functional QKD systems; some evolved even further to the level of being commer-
cialized. As we learned from classical system, no matter how high the level of security of
the protocol is promised in theory, it is utmost necessary to test the function of the real
system. Not only does this make sure that it is working as predicted in theory, but also
tests its resilience against any disturbance of Eve. Some of the systems has already been
put to the testing, and patching loop[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Many vulnerabilities
have been found, and many countermeasures have been developed. By repeating these
loops of hacking and patching, the level of security promised in theory can be reached,
eventually.
We will discuss about these verifications of practical systems–later on they will be called
’Quantum Hacking’– in Chapter 3 and 4. Chapter 3 will be a general discussion about the
implementation of QKD and how the behaviors of physical devices affect the security of the
system. Chapter 4 is about three experimental security verifications and countermeasures
on two QKD systems.
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Chapter 2
Review of theoretical aspect of QKD
Advantages of quantum key distribution (QKD) over its classical counterpart are the prov-
able security in mathematics and no-cloning theorem in quantum mechanics that make the
information carrier, photon, unable to be duplicated without inducing error. This chapter
contains a discussion of theoretical aspect of Quantum Key Distribution.
2.1 Practical BB84
Before we dive into the formal statements and security analysis, let us look at a QKD
protocol as an example: Bennett-Brassard 1984 or BB84 protocol. Named after C. Bennett
and G. Brassard [19] who introduced this protocol in 1984. This protocol is the first
successfully implemented QKD protocol and still being studied and developed until today
[19, 20, 21, 22].This protocol use the state of photon as an information carrier. The protocol
assumed that Alice and Bob have an authenticated classical channel which is read-only for
Eve(i.e. Eve can only read the information transmitted via this channel but cannot interfere
or modify the information). They also have a quantum channel which is fully controlled
by Eve. Eve has infinite resources and computational power and can do everything that is
allowed by laws of physics. The definition of the protocol can be seen in Fig. 2.1.
The security of this protocol rely on the fact that the state of the photon cannot be
duplicated with certainty so that Eve cannot have a perfect copy of the states transmitted
6
Retained bit sequence   1 – – 1 0 0 – 1 0 0 – 1 – 0
Bob’s measurement   1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Bob’s detection basis
Alice’s bit sequence   1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
Light source
Alice
Bob
Diagonal 
detector basis
Horizontal-
vertical 
detector basis
Diagonal 
polarization filters
Horizontal-vertical 
polarization filters
0
0
1
1
Image reprinted from article: W. Tittel, G. Ribordy & N. Gisin, “Quantum cryptography,” Physics World, March 1998 
Figure 2.1: BB84 protocol with polarization encoding.(modified from [23])
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Step Process
(Quantum phase)
Raw key exchange Alice prepare series of qubit state |0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 = |0〉+|1〉,
or |−〉 = |0〉 − |1〉 where |0〉 , |1〉 are orthogonal. She
records the bit value and sends the state to Bob. For
each time slot, Bob locally picks, at random, one of the
two basis of measurement, (0, 1) or (+,−), he performs
the measurement, record the measurement result and
the basis he chose in each bit.
(Classical phase)
Sifting Via a classical authenticated channel, Bob send the in-
dex of slots that he detected signal and their correspond-
ing basis of measurement. Alice keeps only the slots in
which the basis of measurement match her preparation,
and discard the rest. Then, he send the index of those
keeping slot to Bob. Bob discard all other slot. After
that, both map each remaining slots in to respective bi-
nary bit. For example, |0〉 and |+〉 to bit 0 and |1〉 and
|−〉 to bit 1
Error correction Alice and Bob execute an error correction algorithm to
correct any error in their raw key. If the error rate exceed
a certain threshold Q, terminate the protocol. The value
of Q can be estimated from the background count rate
and extinction ratio of Bob’s receiver.
Privacy amplification Alice and Bob apply a hash function to the bit string.
They disclose and compare a portion of the result. They
discard the key if the results are difference, otherwise
keep the rest of the key string as a secret key [24, 25].
Table 2.1: BB84 protocol
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in the quantum channel. In addition, since Eve has no information about the basis of the
states that Alice send, if she try to measure the signal, there is a probability that she picks
the difference basis of measurement compare and induce error on Bob’s detection which can
be detected after sifting step. Another feature of this protocol is that if Eve did not gain
information about the transmission in the quantum channel while the protocol is running,
it is not possible for her to gain information about the key later no matter how much
computational power or technology she has, or will have. This ‘forward security’[26] is
another advantage of QKD protocol over its classical counterpart. That is the scheme and
high-level idea of obtaining a secure key via a QKD system of a QKD protocol1. In next
section, we will discuss about the security statement and mathematical proof of security.
2.2 Security definition of QKD protocol
In general, the success of any key distribution protocol requires three things, correctness,
secrecy, and resilience. Correctness requires that the final keys shared by Alice and Bob
after the protocol execution are identical. This means that all errors in the key sequence
need to be corrected or to be discarded. Secrecy, in information theory, requires that the
keys are equally likely and that the knowledge of Eve about the key is the same before
and after Alice and Bob execute the protocol. Resilience means that the protocol need
to take account of possible interference and tamper from a third party (Eve) and prevent
it. In most cases, this means that the protocol has a monitoring mechanism and post-
processing to decouple Eve’s information from the final key, or allow the process to abort
if any disturbance detected.
As can be seen from the example above, quantum key distribution protocols consist
of two parts namely, Quantum phase and Classical phase. In the Quantum phase, Alice
and Bob produce, transmit, and measure quantum signals via a quantum channel. Clas-
sical phase is where Alice and Bob perform the classical post processing (calculation or
communication via classical channel) on the result from the Quantum phase in order to
generate a secret key. One of the features of any QKD scheme is a process called ‘privacy
amplification’[20, 29] where Alice and Bob are able to generate a secret key out of a string
of partially-secret raw key using a family of functions called ‘U2 hash function’ to map the
raw key of size n to the new key of size l. These functions have a colliding probability
(i.e.the probability to get the same output string out of two different input strings) less
than 1
l
. This ability to provably estimate Eve’s knowledge is an advantage of QKD system
over its classical counterpart.
1For more detail, see[27, 28]
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In the security analysis of QKD, we assume that Eve takes control of the quantum
channel and is able to do everything allowed by the laws of physics in an attempt to gain
information on the state shared by Alice and Bob[19, 22, 30, 9]. Furthermore, Eve is
familiar with protocol and devices Alice and Bob used. We also assume that Eve has full
knowledge about the information communicated via the classical channel.
Now that we get an overview of the goals and the capabilities of QKD, let us begin the
security analysis. The following model considers classical-quantum approach where Alice
and Bob hold classical bits at the end of the protocol (after privacy amplification), while
Eve holds quantum state that might contain information about the final key [7, 30, 9]. Let
|K〉 and |K ′〉 2 be a state that represents the possible classical key shared by Alice and
Bob, respectively, at the end of the protocol, the state of the overall system as viewed by
Eve can be written as,
ρABE =
∑
k
∑
k′
p(k, k′) |K〉 〈K| ⊗ |K ′〉 〈K ′| ⊗ ρ(K,K′)E (2.1)
where ρ
(K,K′)
E is the quantum state hold by Eve which might contain information about
keys. As seen in the previous section, the security of the key require that the key satisfied
the i.i.d.criteria and the keys shared by Alice and Bob are identical, so that the joint
probability, p(k, k′) = 1KδK,K′ where δ is the Kronecker delta function. Furthermore, no
information about the key should have leaked to Eve. In other words, Eve is factored off
or her state is independent of K and K’. So, the ideal overall state at the end of an ideal
protocol should satisfy,
ρidealABE =
∑
k
p(k, k′)
1
K |K〉 〈K| ⊗ ρE (2.2)
According to quantum mechanics, this can be accomplished if there exist a system
with a channel that can reliably share pairs of maximally entangled qubits, for example,
|00〉 ± |11〉. Then the problem turned to be: from their observation, how can Alice and
Bob make sure that their channel can send those states untampered? To answer that
question, let consider a system that generates a pair of signal encoded in one of four states,
0, 1,+, and − and sends them to Alice and Bob. This system has a property that the joint
probability of Alice and Bob’s measurement satisfies table 2.2.
2More detail about Dirac notations and density matrix can be seen in [31, 7].
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p(xy) 0 1 + -
0 p00 0 p0+ p0−
1 0 p11 p1+ p1−
+ p+0 p+1 p++ 0
− p−0 p−1 0 p−−
Table 2.2: Joint probability of detection for an ideal QKD system.pij represent the proba-
bility that Alice detect state i, while Bob detect state j.
From the table, the state |ψ〉 sharing in this system has to be orthogonal to vectors
|01〉 , |10〉 , |+−〉, and,|−+〉. The only solution for |ψ〉 is |00〉±|11〉√
2
which means that this
system is able to share an entangle state. In addition, Alice and Bob can monitor the reli-
ability of the system by observing the cross-over detection probability when they measure
in the same basis (i.e. detection error).
In practice, the verification of those states is based on measurements and statistics,
which might deviate from what was predicted. A more practical security definition is
given by R.Renner in [30],
Definition 2.2.1. A QKD protocol is called -secure, if after the execution of the protocol,
there exists a density matrix ρE so that the inequality
1
2
∥∥ρABE − ρidealABE∥∥ <  (2.3)
holds.
Those density matrices are as defined in equations 2.1 and 2.2. This  is the bound of
the probability that the protocol is not aborted but Eve still holds information about the
key.
2.3 Key-rate equation
From the security definition, R.Renner[30] also derived that the value of  is bounded by
1
2
∥∥ρABE − ρidealABE∥∥ < 2− 12 (Hmin(A|E)−l) (2.4)
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where Hmin(A|E) is the minimal entropy of state A for the states known by E. l is length
of the key after privacy amplification. If the two states on the right were infinitely-close,
the exponent terms on the left is approach zero. Hence, we have
l
N
= fracHmin(A|E)N ≥ S(A|E)− leakEC (2.5)
where S(A|E) is the conditional Holevo entropy of each quantum signal share by Alice
and Bob as seen by Eve. Note that this therm approaches Shannon entropy, H(A|E), as
the signal size N →∞. leakEC is the information leakage during error correction process.
This term is bounded by Shannon entropy between Alice and Bob, H(A|B). As a result a
key rate equation for the raw key of size(signal) N →∞
l
N
= H(A|E)−H(A|B) (2.6)
This is a general structure to calculate the key rate in any QKD protocol.
Now, let us consider BB84 protocol stated in section 2.1. If the channel is not tampered
with, the joint probability of Alice and Bob state should satisfy table 2.2, which means that
the key they generate from the protocol is secure. To find the key rate for this protocol,
let us look at the protocol step-by-step.
• For every raw key exchange, there is a probability pkeep = 1
2
that the key bit is in the
same basis of measurement and that it passes the sifting.
• In the error correction step, Alice and Bob need to disclose some of their bits via a
classical channel. They need to assume that Eve gains full information about those
bits. Let E be the probability of error in the remaining bit. The lower limit of the
disclosed bits in this process is the Shannon entropy h(e)[5].
• Privacy amplification step: from equation 2.6, by reconstruct the state shared by
Alice and Bob out of the joint probability table, [22] derived that the term H(A|E)
is bounded by (1− h(e)).
With all bullets above together, we can write a key rate equation for an ideal BB84
protocol, with raw key size n→∞, as a function of observed error rate.
l
n
=
1
2
(1− 2h(e)) (2.7)
12
This example was set for the reader to get an overview of the security analysis of QKD
system. In order to get a practical key rate, there are many factors that have to be included
in the analysis and this key rate equation will be modified as a result. We will discuss about
these factors and their effect as we look at the implementation of QKD in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Implementation of QKD
As one looks back through the history of cryptography, one might find that one of the
most challenging parts of any cryptosystem is its implementation. Some requirements
of the criteria might be convenient for analysis and calculation but might be hard or
impossible to achieve with the technology at that time. Some unexpected phenomena or
unpredictable behavior of the devices might hinder the communication, or worst, leak the
information to the third party.
This chapter is an overview of the implementation of QKD. This chapter will begin
with an example of physical QKD system that was designed for the BB84 protocol shown
in the previous chapter. These systems will be use as study subject in security verification
of QKD in the next chapter. Second half of this chapter is about the difficulties in building
a QKD system with current technology. This will be an overview about un-predicted
phenomena in the physical system that affect the QKD security and how we adapt the
scheme or include them into the theoretical analysis to overcome those effects.
3.1 Practical QKD systems
This section is about a physical scheme of practical QKD system. Different scheme has
different way of encode and transmit the photon in the quantum phase and different way of
perform post-processing in classical phase. The following is two examples of QKD systems
that designed for BB84 protocol. Each has its own advantages and limitations. These two
systems will be mentioned again when we discuss the security of the system in the next
chapter.
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3.1.1 Polarization encoding free-space QKD system
Free-space QKD is a type of systems that transmits information carriers, photons, through
free space or air. The advantage of this channel is that air, in a clear weather, has low loss
per km, which means that information can be exchanged over a long distance. The example
is the experiment in 2012 [32] which demonstrated quantum teleportation over 143km
Furthermore, free-space QKD is the only type, with current technology, that enables a
satellite-based system, which allows the global-scale QKD network. In contrast, a drawback
of this system is the fluctuation of the atmosphere, which is a result of clouds, dust particle
or air pollution, and can hinder or prevent the communication. Another drawback is the
fact that front-end of the receiver has to be exposed to free space. As a result, this system
suffers from higher noise from the environment. The following is a model of a free-space
system using polarization encoding. This is also a model for satellite QKD project [33].
Alice’s device consists of a laser as a photon source. In each time slot, a light pulse
passes through a polarization modulator(PM) which randomly encodes the polarization
of the photon into horizontal(H), vertical(V), +45◦ (D), and −45◦ (A) [34, 35, 35, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40]. Then, the beam passes through an attenuator(VOA) which decreases the
mean photon number of each pulse below one before sending it to Bob. The intensity
modulator(IM) is used to compensate the fluctuation of the laser source. It also used to
generate decoy signals in decoy-stare QKD scheme. The polarization controller is used to
compensate polarization shift in the fiber and optics components.
At Bob’s side, the receiver consists of a beamsplitter(BS) which acts as a passive basis
selection. In each arm of BS is a polarizing beamsplitter(PBS) which, in one arm, is aligned
to match the HV basis on Alice and in the other arm is aligned to match DA basis. Finally,
a detector is attached to each arm of the PBS to detect the photon. Alice and Bob can use
this system for the BB84 protocol mention in previous section by mapping the HV basis
onto 0 and 1 and DA basis to + and − (See fig.3.1).
3.1.2 Phase encoding fiber-based QKD system
As the name suggested, fiber-based system is a system that transmits signal via fiber
optics. That makes this type of system relatively easier for alignment and maintenance in
comparison to the free-space counterpart. The drawback of this system is the loss in fiber
optics, which limits the distance of communication. Nevertheless, fiber optics is a choice
for many commercial systems. The following is the scheme for a phase encoding system
called plug-and-play QKD system by IDQuantique.[42, 43]
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Figure 3.1: Polarization encoding free-space BB84 system (reprinted from [41]).
The scheme of the system is in 3.2. The following description is collected from [42, 43,
11] Pulses originate in Bob’s laser at a fixed rate. They pass through an unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer (MZI) where one arm is intentionally made longer than the other
arm. The longer arm has a polarization rotator to rotate the polarization by 90 ◦. It also
has a phase modulator that acts as a measurement basis for Bob. The phase modulator
is off during the first pass when the light is travelling from Bob to Alice. The two pulses
from two arms gets combined by the polarization beam splitter and goes out into the
quantum channel. For each pulse generated by Bob’s laser, there are two orthogonally
polarized pulses in the optical link going towards Alice with a fixed delay between them
corresponding to the difference in the arm length of the MZI. The first pulse is called the
reference pulse while the second pulse is called the signal pulse. The signal pulse has lower
energy than the reference pulse because it goes through the longer arm consisting of the
phase modulator and suffers additional loss.
Alice’s attenuator VOA1 attenuates the signal, her phase modulator (PM) applies a
random phase φA (0,
pi
2
, pi, 3pi
2
), and the Faraday mirror (FM) reflects and rotates the polar-
ization orthogonally for both pulses. The two pulses arrive at Bob and take the opposite
arms of the MZI than the ones they took before. The PM in the long arm is now ‘on’ and
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Figure 3.2: Plug-and-play system. Reprinted from [11]
applies a random phase φB (either 0 or
pi
2
). As a result of the combination of the FM and
the unbalanced MZI, the two pulses have the same polarization and path difference, and
arrive at Bob’s 50:50 beamsplitter (BS) at the same time. Hence, the choice of the output
BS path depends only on their relative phase difference (φ = φA − φB). Two detectors
D0, D1 and a circulator are used in the configuration shown in the Fig. 3.2 to collect the
light after the BS. If φ = 0 (φ = pi), the pulses emerge at the same (different) path from
which they came, and are collected by D1 (D0). This is a measurement in the compatible
basis. However, if Alice and Bob choose different bases (such that φ = pi
2
or 3pi
2
), then the
photons are split with equal probability between D0 and D1.
3.2 Difficulties in implementation of QKD and possi-
ble solutions
This section is about difficulties of taking the idea and concept in the paper and implement
it in reality. Those difficulties might be because of lack of technology, or an unexpected
behavior of the devices which was not included in security analysis. In this section, we
will look at the problems and its effects, then discuss about the possible solution for that
problem.
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Mean photon number
photon number 0.1 0.3 0.5 1
0 0.904 0.740 0.606 0.367
1 0.090 0.222 0.303 0.367
2 0.004 0.033 0.075 0.183
3 0.0001 0.003 0.012 0.061
Table 3.1: Probability distribution of photon-per-pulse for different mean photon number.
3.2.1 Single photon source versus weak coherent source
One of the major problem in the implementation of QKD is the reliably single photon
source is still under developed. A photon source that behave closest to the single photon
source is the attenuated pulse laser or weak coherence source.
By the fact that the distribution of photon number, p(N,µ), in each laser pulse is
governed by Poisson distribution,
p(N,µ) =
µN exp−µ
N !
(3.1)
where µ is mean photon number, N is the number of photon in each pulse. Since the
mean photon number of the laser is proportioned to the laser’s power, µ can be controlled
by the power that drives laser and attenuator or density filter. If the source was set such
that µ < 1 majority of the non-empty pulses are single photon. See table 3.2.1.
Though most of the pulses are single photon, Eve, who is limited only by law of physics
still be able to take advantage of. She can perform, so call, Photon Number Splitting(PNS)
attack [44, 25, 45, 22], see Table 3.2.1.
It can be seen that if the probability of multi-photon pulse is too high so that Eve able
to block all single photon pulses; Eve will gain full information about the key. Otherwise,
Eve still gains higher information about the key than estimated in the ideal situation
analysed in the previous chapter.
To handle this attack, Alice and Bob need to look back at their protocol and key rate
equation. From the attack scheme, they need to assume the worst case where Eve gains
full information about every multi-photon pulse sent by Alice. By characterize the source,
they know the probability of getting multi-photon pulse, Pmulti. Furthermore, they can
estimate the detection rate, Pdet of the signal by characterize Bob’s receiver and the channel
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Step Process
(Quantum phase)
Raw key exchange Eve replaces Alice and Bob’s channel with a lossless
channel. Then, she determines the photon number in
each incoming pulse from Alice using quantum non de-
molition measurement, which does not disturb the quan-
tum state. For each multi-photon pulse, Eve keeps one
photon in her quantum memory and passes the rest to
Bob. For single photon pulse, she takes advantage of her
lossless channel by blocking some of the pulse to main-
tain total detection rate of Bob. If the rate of single
photon cannot keep up with original Alice and Bob’s
line loss, she blocks some multi-photon pulse, in addi-
tion.
(Classical phase)
Sifting Eve listens to Alice and Bob’s communication in the
classical channel and measure photons in her memory
using the correct basis announced by Alice and Bob.
Table 3.2: Photon number splitting (PNS) attack.
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condition without Eve present. From that, Alice and Bob can rule out portion of their
key that Eve might know. Further more, Alice and Bob need to assume the worst-case
scenario where the bits that Eve gained information of were detected by Bob, passed all
post processing, and be part of the final key. As a result, they need to take this into their
privacy amplification part in their key rate equation. Let A = (Pdet − Pmulti)/Pdet [22, 9]
The modified key rate equation is
l
n
=
A
2
(1−H(E
A
)− leakEC) (3.2)
where leakEC is the portion of information that Alice and Bob disclosed in error cor-
rection step. It can be seen from this equation that, by characterizing their devices and
find the value of A, Alice and Bob can generate key using a weak coherent source.
3.2.2 Multiple click and squashing model
Many QKD system employ multiple detectors in the receiver to detect signal in each basis
or each encoded state. In each time slot these systems have a chance to have multiple
detection or ’click’ across multiple detector. This might occurred by darkcount in the de-
tector, or detection of a multi-photon pulse in wrong basis, or Eve’s interference. While
this cause problem in the key mapping process, this double clicks cannot be simply ne-
glected or discarded by the protocol. The reason is that, if the protocol discarded every
double click; Eve can perform intercept-and-resend attack as seen in previous chapter with
some modification. Instead of sending single photon pulse with the same state as her mea-
surement result, bright pulse can be sent. This pulse will cause single click only when their
polarization match Bob’s basis. Otherwise, it will course double clicks and is rejected. As
seen before that the error causes by intercept and resend attack happened because of basis
mismatch between Eve and Bob, this attack of Eve will never cause an error, and such
gone undetected.
One of the solutions called ’squashing model’ was introduced in [46]. This model stated
that double-click in one basis is mapped to a random value in that basis, while multiple
clicks in different bases are discarded, see fig3.3.
3.2.3 Statistical deviation and finite key size effect
With limited detection and transmission efficiency, computational power, and most impor-
tantly time, only finite amount of raw key can be exchanged during the quantum phase.
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Figure 3.3: Squashing model for BB84 system.(reprinted from [11])
As a result, there are some statistical deviation and failure probability that needed to be
considered. For example, the error rate estimated in the parameter estimation process
might not represent the error rate of the key. Furthermore, error correction algorithm has
a probability that not all the error be detected and corrected. In addition, even though the
observed error rate was zero, that does not mean that Eve did not perform an attack. For
example, BB84 system with n raw key exchange has a chance of 0.75n that an intercept-
and-resend gone unnoticed. Many literature studied these effects and provided correction
terms for the key rate equation to take account on these effects [30, 47, 48]. The key rate
equation for finite key size effect can be written as
l ≤ nA(1−H(E
A
)− leakEC)− 1
2
√
(
ln(1/PE) ln(n+ 1)2)
n
−7
√
1
n
log(
2
′
))− 2log 1
PA
− log 2
EC
(3.3)
where the first correction term is the result of statistical deviation in parameter es-
timation step where PE is the probability that the key has more errors than what was
estimated in parameter estimation step. The second took account account of statistical
approximation in privacy amplification step, where ′ is the probability of failure. The
third term is for the probability, PA, that the hatch function transforms two different key
sequence into the same final key. The last term takes account of failure probability, EC ,
of error correction where there is non-zero error bit left after the correction.[30, 47, 48]
The key generated by a protocol which is not aborted under this analysis satisfies -
security [30] defined in section 2.1. The value of  is a summation of all security parameters,
s, in each correction term. It can be seen that all s are free variables. Which means that
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 can be set as small as necessary to maintain the level of security Alice and Bob require.
The consequence is smaller  lower the secret key rate. [30, 47, 48]
According to R. Renner, the security parameter, , can be picked to be the same
order as major natural disasters such as serious earthquake, volcanic eruption or nuclear
power plant meltdown. If such disaster happened, it is most likely that the security of
the key would not matter anymore. For example, the probability of a nuclear power plant
meltdown is 10−4 per year, according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. If QKD
machine generates two keys every minute or approximately a few million keys a year, one
might pick  = 10−10 so that the probability that at least one key leak to Eve is the same
order as such disasters. [30]
3.2.4 Real device versus theoretical expectation
One of the most challenges of QKD implementation is to make the device works exactly as
stated in the protocol. Otherwise, it might open a side channel for Eve to take advantage
of. For example, if the mechanics that produce V-polarization in BB84 system cause time
delay on that bit compare to other polarizations, Eve can monitor that time delay and gain
some information about the key [49]. This is also true for other variables. Another example
is the fake-state attack [17, 50] where Eve takes advantage of Bob detectors’ imperfection
to control the detection result.
Not only works as the protocol stated, the QKD system also needs to be secured against
any tampering by Eve. An example of this is the Trojan horse attack [51] where Eve sends
some extra bright pulse and measures the reflection to the system to monitor the state of
components inside and learn about the measurement. Another example is blinding attack
[15] which Eve sends some bright pulse to cause the avalanche photo diode in the receiver
not response to single photon pulse.
Most of these imperfections and vulnerability are not discovered until the system was
implemented and put to the test. These vulnerabilities needed to be investigated in scheme-
by-scheme basis. Then, countermeasures can be implemented whether by modify the
scheme or theoretical analysis. After that, the system with the countermeasure has to
be tested again. This is because the countermeasure might not work as expected, or worse,
it might open a new loophole for other attacks. This loop of testing and patching shall be
seen in the chapter three when we discuss about Quantum Hacking in detail.
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Chapter 4
Attacks on QKD systems
The study of its physical implementation reveled a number of vulnerability of QKD [41,
12, 13, 14, 52, 49, 16, 17, 18]. The main reason behind this is the deviation of the ac-
tual behavior of the devices from the ideal expected behaviour. Thus, to guarantee the
security, it is of utmost importance to scrutinize the practical device behaviors for possible
deviations.
4.1 Attack on free-space QKD system
In this section, we will show experimentally that by modifying spatial mode of light can
affect Bob’s detection efficiency. In first experiment, we investigated an attack called fake
state attack [50, 53] on a BB84 system. This attack is a modification of the intercept-
and-resend attack where Eve intercept photons from Alice and generate new photons cor-
responding to her measurement result. These photons are sent to Bob in such a way that
they cannot be detected if Bob picks a basis of measurement different from Eve. Hence,
Eve gains information about the key without inducing error, see fig. 4.1. Recently, many
variants of fake state attack have been studied [50, 53, 54, 55, 16, 49, 56]. This experi-
ment investigated a fake state attack where the beam from Eve is sent at an angle such
that the beam focuses only on the intended detector with the same polarization as Eve’s
measurement result while the beam misses other detectors, see fig. 4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Fake state attack on BB84 protocol. The scenario that cause error in an
intercept-and-resend attack on a BB84 system is when Alice and Bob pick the same basis
of measurement but Eve picks the other. If Eve sends her photon to Bob in such a way
that the detection efficiency in the different basis of Bob is zero, she can perform an
intercept-and-resend attack without being noticed.
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Figure 4.2: An illustration of spatial-mode detection efficiency mismatch. The beam from
Eve (red line) is sent to Bob in an angle diverging from the normal setup by Alice and
Bob(green line). This angle is picked such that the beam path hit the collecting lens 1 and
being detected in the D/A basis, but misses the H/V detector. Thus, this angle can be
used to send D/A fake state to Bob without inducing error(modified from [54]).
4.1.1 System under test
We tested a free-space receiver which is a model for a satellite QKD project [33]. This
receiver employs a telescope to reduce the size of the collimated beam. It operating at
532 nm wavelength. Its telescope consists of a focusing lens L1 (diameter 50 mm, focal
length f = 250 mm; Thorlabs AC508-250-A) and a collimating lens L2 (f = 11 mm;
Thorlabs A397TM-A). The collimated beam of . 2 mm diameter then passes through
a 50:50 beamsplitter BS (custom pentaprism [33]) and a pair of polarizing beamsplitters
PBS1 and PBS2 (Thorlabs PBS121). PBS2 increases the polarization extinction ratio in
the reflected arm of PBS1. Lenses L3 (Thorlabs PAF-X-18-PC-A) focus the four beams
into 105 µm core diameter multimode fibers (Thorlabs M43L01) leading to single-photon
detectors (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-12-FC).
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4.1.2 Spatial mode detection efficiency mismatch
Motivation
One of the assumptions on the security proof of QKD is the symmetry of detection efficiency
among all received quantum states in Bob’s detector [17, 55, 16, 49, 56]. If a deviation
from this assumption exists, an adversary Eve can send light to Bob in different spatial
modes so that one of his detectors has a relatively higher probability of click than the other
detector(s) [54]. In this way, she can exploit the mismatch in efficiency and make Bob’s
measurement outcome dependent on his measurement basis and correlated to Eve, which
breaks the assumptions of typical security proofs. In this work, we investigate how crucial
this can be to the security of QKD.
My contribution to this experiment is as followeds:
Experiments, data acquisition and post processing
- Programmed scanning and data acquisition, See Appendix A.1
- Find the sources of mismatch in the optical scheme
- Together with Sajeed: finished experiment design for the first experiment, assembled and
performed experiments, analyzed data
Attack model
- Independently analyzed and modeled an attack using a photon number state emitter at
Eve., See Appendix A.2
Paper publication
- Wrote the first draft of experimental setup and method. - Refined mathematical descrip-
tion in security analysis part. -Scheme and figure drawing
Method
In order to exploit the mismatch in efficiency, Eve needs to know the mismatch for the four
detectors as a function of the input angle. Hence, our first step was to scan Bob’s receiver for
a possible efficiency mismatch. Eve’s source [Fig. 4.3(a)] consists of a 532 nm laser coupled
into single-mode fiber, attenuator A, polarization controller PC, and a collimating lens
L4 (Thorlabs C220TME-A) mounted on a two-axis motorised translation stage (Thorlabs
MAX343/M). In Fig. 4.3(a), green (light gray) marginal rays denote the initial alignment
from Eve, replicating the alignment from Alice to Bob. This is the initial position of the
translation stage φ = θ = 0. As we moved the stage in the transverse plane, it changed
the beam’s incidence angle and lateral displacement at Bob’s front lens L1 simultaneously.
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This is shown by red (dark gray) marginal rays in Fig. 4.3(a), representing a beam from
Eve coming at an angle (φ, θ) relative to the initial beam.
Before scanning, the optics in Bob’s apparatus was aligned to maximize coupling into
all four detectors at the normal incidence, which is the standard alignment procedure for
QKD. Note that many free-space QKD systems employ a real-time tracking system to
maintain this initial alignment [57, 36, 37, 40]. We then started the scanning procedure
that involved first, changing the outgoing beam’s angle (φ, θ), and then recording the
corresponding count rate at all four detectors of Bob. For each data point, we used an
integration time of 1 s. Our scan consisted of approximately 100 × 100 data points in
a square matrix covering the whole clear aperture of Bob’s front lens L1. Then during
post-processing, for each data point for each detector, we subtracted the corresponding
detector’s background count rate, and then normalized it by dividing by the maximum
count rate in that detector.
At first, we did a preliminary scan using optical power meters (Thorlabs PM200 with
S130C head) that revealed several features, highlighted in Fig. 4.3(b). Around φ = θ = 0,
maximum light coupling resulted in the central peak¶. With increasing scanning angle,
the focused beam started missing the fiber core, and the detector count dropped off·. A
region was found when the beam reflected off a polished edge of PBS2 back into the fiber
core, causing the peak ¸. Increasing the angle further made the beam hit the anodized
aluminum mount of L1 and possibly edges of other lens mounts and round elements in
the optical assembly. It was scattered at these edges, producing two ring-like features¹.
Beyond these features, there were no noticeable power reading, as the beam completely
missed the receiver aperture.
We then adjusted the receiver setup to minimize the peak ¸, and performed final
scans at 26.1 m distance using Bob’s single-photon detectors (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-
12-FC). During these scans, the beam at L1 was Gaussian-shaped with 9 mm width (at
1/e2 peak intensity). The scans were done in 38.3 µrad steps covering ±1.84 mrad range,
corresponding to lateral displacement of ±48 mm at L1.
Experimental result
Figure 4.4 shows the normalized detection efficiency in all four receiver channels as a func-
tion of (φ, θ). Most of the original features are still visible. However, outside the narrow
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Figure 4.3: Experimental setup. (a) Scheme of the experimental apparatus, top view
(drawing not to scale). Eve’s source consists of a fiber-coupled 532 nm laser, attenuator
A, polarization controller PC, and a collimating lens mounted on a two-axis motorised
translation stage. The latter allows changing the beam’s incidence angle and lateral dis-
placement at Bob’s front lens L1 simultaneously. Green (light gray) marginal rays parallel
to the optical axis denote the original alignment of Alice’s beam to Bob. Red and blue
(dark gray) marginal rays show a scanning beam from Eve tilted at an angle (φ, θ) relative
to the original beam. Features ¶–¹ mark different transmission paths for light inside
Bob. (b) Normalized detection efficiency η in channel V versus the illumination angle
(φ, θ). This scan was taken to show the features clearly by placing Eve at a closer distance.
(c) Photograph of Bob’s receiver. The actual distance between facing surfaces of L2–BS
is 42 mm, BS–PBS1 66 mm, PBS1–L3 31 mm, PBS1–PBS2 45 mm, PBS2–L3 10 mm in
channel A and 5 mm in channel V.
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Figure 4.4: Angular efficiency scan of the receiver, and points of interest. Four pair of plots
H, V, D, A shown in both 3D and 2D represent normalized detection efficiency in the
four receiver channels versus illuminating beam angle (φ, θ). The angle φ = θ = 0 is the
initial angle of QKD operation. The last plot shows angle ranges with a high mismatch,
usable in our attack.
central range of angles close to φ = θ = 0, individual channel’s efficiencies vary inde-
pendently. Also, the size and shape of the central peak is significantly different between
channels. This was impossible to identify during the normal alignment procedure. This
effect can be attributed to imprecise focusing, optical path length difference between the
arms, off-centered alignment of lenses, mode-dependent bending loss in fibers, and individ-
ual variations in components. These may have also caused the efficiency at one side of the
outer ring being higher. Because of these reasons, there exist angles such that if photons
are sent at those angles, one channel has a much higher click probability than the rest.
Effect on the security of the QKD system
To emphasize the security threat, it is useful to model an attack that exploits the discovered
side-channel. One possible attack is the faked-state attack [17, 50], which is an intercept-
and-resend attack in which Eve attempts to deterministically control Bob’s basis choice
and detection outcome. We model a practical faked-state attack using the obtained data
and the following assumptions: Alice and Bob perform non-decoy-state Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol using polarization encoding. Alice emits weak coherent pulses with
mean photon number µ equal to Alice–Bob line transmittance [45]. Whenever Bob regis-
ters a multiple click, he performs a squashing operation [46, 58, 59]. Alice and Bob also
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monitor total sifted key rate, and quantum bit error ratio (QBER). Eve has information
about Bob’s receiver characteristics described above, and only uses devices available in
today’s technology. She intercepts photons at the output of Alice, using an active basis
choice and superconducting nanowire detectors, with overall detection efficiency ηe = 0.85
and dark count probability < 10−9 per bit slot [60]. Then, a part of her, situated close to
Bob, regenerates the measured signal and sends to Bob. We assume that Alice–Bob and
Alice–Eve fidelity F = 0.9831 [33], while Eve–Bob experimentally measured F = 0.9904.
Here fidelity refers to the probability that a polarized photon will emerge from the PBS
at the correct path, which is related to visibility by F = (1 + visibility)/2. We also con-
firmed experimentally that Eve–Bob fidelity is preserved at all illumination angles shown
in Fig. 4.4.
From Eve’s point of view, she wants to maximize the detection probability when Bob
measures in compatible (i.e., same as her) basis, to maximize Eve–Bob mutual informa-
tion. Also, she wants to minimize Bob’s detection probability in non-compatible basis,
to minimize QBER. Let ηi(j) be the efficiency of Bob’s i-th channel (i ∈ {h, v, d, a})
given that incoming light is j ∈ {H,V,D,A} polarized. Thus to find attack points for
the j-th polarization, we choose angles that have higher values of ηj(j) and δj(j) =
min
{
ηj(j)
ηnc0(j)
,
ηj(j)
ηnc1(j)
}
, where ηnc0 and ηnc1 are the normalized efficiencies of the two de-
tectors in the non-compatible basis. Our experimental attack angles are shown in the
rightmost plot in Fig. 4.4. For example, the H attack angles were composed of points
for which ηh(H) ≥ 0.2 and δh(H) ≥ 75. Similarly, for the V, D and A attack angles,
ηv(V ) ≥ 0.002, δV ≥ 8; ηd(D) ≥ 0.4, δD ≥ 80; ηa(A) ≥ 0.1, δA ≥ 20. The thresholds used
here to find the attack angles were not optimal, and were picked manually.
To derive the key rate and QBER formula in Eve’s presence, we start with a system
with only Eve and Bob. Without loss of generality, consider Eve sending an H-polarized
pulse to Bob within the attack angles H. Let’s consider a pulse of photon number n arrive
at Bob. The probability pi(j)
n that detector i in Bob clicks given Eve has sent j-polarized
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light given n-photon arrival is
pnh(H) = ch +
n−1∑
r=1
(
1
2
)n(
n
r
)
(1− (1− ηh)r)(1− ηa/2− ηd/2)n−r,
pnv (H) = cv +
n−1∑
r=1
(
1
2
)n(
n
r
)
(1− ηh)r(1− ηa/2− ηd/2)n−r,
pnd(a)(H) = cd(a) +
n−1∑
r=1
(
1
2
)n(
n
r
)
(1− ηh)r
n−1∑
r=1
(
r
m
)
(1− (1− ηd(a))m)((
1
2
)
(1− (1− ηa(d))r−m) + (1− ηa(d))r−m
)
(4.1)
By symmetry, the detection rate of all other detectors follow the same form. This
equation includes the effect of the squashing scheme and absorbes all internal loss inside
the receiver into the detection probability in each detector. The total probability of click-
ing in each one detector for incoming H-polarization given an arbitrary photon number
distribution f(n) is
ph(H) =
∞∑
n=1
(f(n)(pnh(H) + p
n
h(V ) + p
n
h(D) + p
n
h(A))) (4.2)
where ci is Bob’s background click probability per bit slot in i-th channel. Again, the
detection rate of all other detectors follow the same form.
To further emphasize the effect of this attack, we consider a realistic Eve who employs
only tools available by current technology. In this analysis we assume that Eve’s photon
source is a weak coherent source that produces pulses with photon number distribution
following the Poisson distribution. By the nature of the detection, which registers only
’click’ and ’no click’, the detection probability in Bob’s detection rate in each detector can
be simplified as follows. Before squashing, the raw click probability pi(j) that detector i
in Bob clicks given Eve has sent j-polarized light is
ph(H) ≈ ch + 1− exp
(
−µHFηh(H)
2
)
,
pv(H) ≈ cv + 1− exp
(
−µH(1− F )ηv(H)
2
)
,
pd(a)(H) ≈ cd(a) + 1− exp
(
−µHηd(a)(H)
4
)
,
(4.3)
31
where µH is Eve’s mean photon number. The probability Phv(H) that after squashing
Bob measures in HV basis, given Eve has sent an H-polarized pulse, is composed of three
events: when only detector H clicks, when only detector V clicks, or when both click. It
can be written as
Phv(H) =
[
1− pd(H)
][
1− pa(H)
]
× [ph(H) + pv(H)− ph(H)pv(H)]. (4.4)
Let’s now include Alice into the picture. Consider Alice sends an H-polarized pulse, and
Eve intercepts it. Let P ec ≈ 12(1−e−µFηe)e−µ(1−F )ηe and P ew ≈ 12e−µFηe(1−e−µ(1−F )ηe) be the
probability that Eve measures in the compatible basis (i.e., the same basis as Alice) and gets
a click only in the correct and wrong detector respectively. Let P enc ≈ 12(1− e−
µηe
2 )e−
µηe
2 be
the probability that she measures in the non-compatible basis (different basis than Alice’s)
and gets a click in a single detector. The sifted key rate given Alice has sent H-polarized
light is
Re(H) ≈P ec Phv(H) + P ewPhv(V ) + P enc [Phv(D)+Phv(A)]
+ (1− P ec − P ew − 2P enc)(ch + cv − chcv).
(4.5)
An error can occur when Eve measures Alice’s signal in non-compatible basis or when Eve
measures in compatible basis but Bob measures a wrong value owing to imperfect fidelity
or dark count. Hence, the error rate conditioned on Alice sending H-polarized light is
EH ≈P ec Pv(H) + P ewPv(V ) + P enc [Pv(D) + Pv(A)]
+ (1− P ec − P ew − 2P enc)(cv −
cvch
2
),
(4.6)
where Pi(j) is the probability that Bob measures value i after squashing, given Eve has
sent j-polarized light. For example,
Pv(H) =
[
pv(H)− ph(H)pv(H)
2
][
1− pd(H)
][
1− pa(H)
]
. (4.7)
Sifted key rates and errors in Eve’s presence [Eqs. (4.5) and (4.6)] conditioned on V , D,
A polarizations sent by Alice can be calculated similarly. The total sifted key rate and
QBER in Eve’s presence become
Re =
1
4
∑
j=H,V,D,A
Re(j),
QBERe =
1
4Re
∑
j=H,V,D,A
Ej.
(4.8)
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Figure 4.5: Modeled QBER observed by Bob versus line loss. The dotted curve shows
QBER without Eve. At lower line loss, the QBER is due to imperfect fidelity, while at
higher line loss Bob’s detector background counts become the dominant contribution. The
lower solid curve (blue) shows QBERe under our attack when only the total Bob’s sifted
key rate Rab is matched. The upper solid curve (red) additionally keeps his four channel
rates equal.
The only free parameters left for Eve to manipulate are the mean photon numbers of
her signal. Knowing the angular scanning data, Eve can use a numerical optimization to
find values of µH , µV , µD, µA that minimize QBERe while keeping Re = Rab, where Rab
is Bob’s sifted key rate without Eve. Our numerical optimization achieves this for Alice–
Bob channel loss ≥ 3 dB if they are willing to accept a slight increase of QBER by less
than 0.7% (see Fig. 4.5). Here we assumed Bob’s detector parameters as measured by us:
efficiency at φ = θ = 0 was 0.4 in all four channels, and individual detector background
count probabilities were in the range of 430 × 10−9 to 1560 × 10−9 per 1 ns coincidence
window. These optimization results are realistic conditions for a successful attack on most
communication channels [34, 35, 61, 62, 37, 38, 40, 33] Note that the distance Eve–Bob
can be increased without affecting attack performance, by replacing Eve’s illuminator with
four collimators oriented at the required attack angles.
We went further and imposed an additional constraint on Eve to make Re(H) =
Re(V ) = Re(D) = Re(A) = Rab. Our optimization shows that it is still possible for
Eve to pick appropriate mean photon numbers and successfully attack the system with
resultant QBER < 6.82% in 3–15 dB line loss range (Fig. 4.5). Similar QBER values are
typical for outdoor channels, because of background light. Eve could shield Bob from the
latter to hide QBER resulting from her attack.
We would like to point out that the attack angles depend on the way the setup is
constructed, the imperfections of each individual sample of component, and each individual
alignment procedure. I.e., no two setups are identical, even if they are produced in the
same assembly line, and they will generally have different attack angles. However, from a
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theoretical point of view, in quantum cryptography it is assumed from Kerckhoffs’ principle
[6] that except for the keys themselves, Eve has knowledge about all other parameters in
the system. It is thus a valid assumption that she knows the attack angles. From a practical
point of view, Eve may try techniques proposed in [50]. She may replace a small fraction
of the signal states with faked states at different spatial angles, then listen to the classical
communication to get an estimate of the efficiency of Bob’s detectors at those angles.
In this way she may gradually improve her estimate on the mismatch without causing
excessive QBER. When she has enough information on the statistics of the mismatch, she
can launch her full-fledged attack.
Possible countermeasure
This section is a part of [41] A countermeasures that might be able to prevent this spatial-
mode detector-efficiency-mismatch attack is placing a spatial filter or ‘pinhole’ at the focal
plane of lenses L1 and L2. Since the pinhole limits the field of view, any light entering at a
higher spatial angle is blocked and Eve no longer has access to the target angles required
to have control over Bob. We tested this countermeasure by placing pinhole of various
diameters from 100 µm to 25 µm. Then, we perform the scan and find the mismatch
area as we did previously. We found that the pinhole smaller than 25 µm in this specific
optical setup can prevent the attack. The scan result is shown in Fig.4.6. The trade-off
of this countermeasure is that the pinhole limited the field of view of the scanning from
approximately 1.5 mrad(outer ring of the scan without pinhole) to 0.4 mrad (width of
visible peak in the scan with pinhole). In practice, this might cause some loss due to
diffraction in the optics, and angular deviation of the incoming beam under atmospheric
turbulence. The limited field of view might also cause difficulties in pointing and tracking
between Alice and Bob, and require a more precise and stable pointing system.
4.1.3 Laser damage
In the previous experiment we have already presented the ability of Eve to force a detection
efficiency mismatch on a QKD system and presented a possible countermeasure. This
study push us further in the loop of hacking and patching where Eve tries to overcome the
countermeasure Alice and Bob deployed. We tested the same receiver to find out whether
Eve is able to overcome the countermeasure or not.
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Figure 4.6: Angular efficiency scan of the receiver after a 25 µm diameter pinhole (Thorlabs
P25S) is placed in the focal plane of L1, L2 [4.3(a)]. No detectable mismatch between
channels was found under tight search conditions ηi(j) ≥ 0.001 and δi(j) ≥ 4.
Motivation
After looks at a system with a countermeasure to her attack, Eve might tries to get around
those countermeasures or exploit other weakness for other attack. This is the first time
that Eve attempts to damage or destroy the countermeasure to recover her attack.
The security of the QKD system also assumes that the systems in Alice and Bob control
are in an isolated environment where Eve does not have physical access nor can alter the
devices inside. However, the front-end of a QKD system is essentially an analog optical
system connected to the channel, and easily accessible by an eavesdropper. This section is
a study of a new class of attack, laser damage attack, where Eve uses a high-power laser
to damage or alter the properties of some components inside the receiver. To prove this
idea, this research is a study about effect of a high-power laser on the pinhole’s material.
After that we investigated the ability of Eve to recover her spatial-mode detection-efficiency
mismatch attack. The core idea is simple, try to widen the hole of pinhole using high-power
laser without damaging other components in the receiver.
My contribution to this experiment is as followed(together with S.Sajeed):
-Apparatus setup and testing
-Post processing and security verification
-Wrote the first draft of method section
-Scheme and figure drawing
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Method
The first experiment was to test whether the high-power laser was able to damage the
pinhole (Thorlabs P25S) material, a 13 µm thick stainless steel plate. The latter contained
a 810 nm laser diode (Jenoptik JOLD-30-FC-12) pumped by a current-stabilized power
supply and was connected to a 200 µm core diameter multimode fiber. It provided a
continuously adjustable 0 to 30 W c.w. power into the fiber. The reason for this wavelength
was because, in the receiver under test, there were a pair of wavelength-selective filters
placed right after lens L2. Those filters effectively work as a 532 nm narrow-band pass
filter. The purpose of these filter was to reduce stray light and noise from the environment.
By picking the high-power laser wavelength to be 810 nm, most of the laser’s energy would
be filtered off. With this, we expected that we would be able to damage the pinhole
without damaging other components, especially the APD. This filter is a good example of
a component that is put into an implementation for a specific purpose but open loophole
for another attack.
We began by focusing the laser with a 7.5cm-focal length lens on to a pinhole placed at
the focal point of the laser. We gradually increased the laser power until the metal plate
around the pinhole began to burnt or vaporized. We found that the sample was burnt
within 5 seconds with powers above 2 W.
The second test was whether laser can damage the filters. We replaced the pinhole in
the previous test with a replica of filters inside the receiver. We gradually increased the
laser power output up to 20 W. At such point, the core of the fiber connected to the laser
was burnt but the filter was undamaged. We suspected that the laser reflected from the
filter was the cause of the fiber damaged. This test concluded that the power level that
damages the pinhole does not affect the filters.
The next test is to prove that Eve is able to damage the pinhole without damaging
other components. First, the receiver were set to the normal operation. Next, the APD
on the receiver were replaced with the power meters. Then, a collimated high-power laser
beam was sent from one meter away through the center of the lenses L1 and L2. We
measured the laser power on three points, in front of L1, in front of L3, and at the end of
fiber optics in each channel. We found that, even though the laser power was more than
10W measured in front of L1, only the order of µW power was measured at L3 and only
nW power was measured at the end of the fiber optics which is the safe level for the APD.
Note that the direct measurement of the power at the pinhole’s position inside the receiver
was not possible since the high-power probe cannot fit inside the receiver.
The final attack test was done at 26.1 m distance. After inserting the pinhole (Thorlabs
P25S) at the focal point of lens L1 and L2, we repeated our experiment on the previous
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section to confirm that the pinhole was able to prevent the efficiency mismatch attack.
Next, the scanning apparatus on Eve’s side was replaced by the high power laser and a
plano-convex lens L5 (Thorlabs LA1131-B; Fig. 4.7a). A nearly collimated beam was sent
to Bob. The beam’s intensity was nearly uniformly distributed across Bob’s L1 (50 mm
diameter achromatic doublet, Thorlabs AC508-250-A), with less than ±10% intensity fluc-
tuation across Bob’s input aperture. Transmission of L1 was about 82%, owing to its
antireflection coating being designed for a different wavelength band. Note that these
transmission percentages were a result from a separate test where 100mW laser of 810nm
were sent through each components and measured by a power meter on the other side. As
a result, the power delivered at the pinhole plane was 3.6 W, sufficient to reliably produce
a hole of ≈ 150 µm diameter in less than 10 s in a standard stainless-steel foil pinhole
(Thorlabs P25S).
Result
This section is part of [63]. After the last test, the burning apparatus was removed and
another scan process was done. The counts from each channel were put in the analysis as
we did in the efficiency mismatch. With this larger pinhole opening, it was again possible to
send light at angles that had relatively higher mismatches in efficiency as shown in Fig. 4.8b.
This enabled the faked-state attack under realistic conditions of channel loss in the 1–15 dB
range with a quantum bit error ratio (QBER) < 6.6%. Thus laser damage completely
neutralizes this countermeasure, and makes this free-space QKD system insecure.
4.2 Attack on a fiber-based QKD system
4.2.1 System under test
The subject of this study is a plug-and-play QKD system, Clavis2, produced by IDQuan-
tique(IDQ). The detail of this system was given in the previous section on the example
of fiber-based QKD system. More detail and specifications of the system can be seen in
[42, 43]. The security of this system implemented in the manufacturer’s software is based
on the security analysis in [64] which did not considered the finite key-size effect.
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Figure 4.7: Attack on a free-space QKD system. a, Experimental setup. QKD receiver Bob
consists of two lenses L1, L2 reducing input beam diameter, 50:50 beamsplitter BS, and
two arms measuring photons in HV and DA polarizations using polarizing beamsplitters
PBS [41, 33]. Photons are focused by lenses L3 into multimode fibers leading to single-
photon detectors. Setup drawing is not to scale. Eve’s apparatus contains a scanning laser
source that tilts the beam angle (φ, θ) by laterally shifting lens L4. Green marginal rays
denote initial Eve’s alignment, replicating the alignment Alice–Bob at φ = θ = 0. Red
marginal rays show a tilted scanning beam missing fiber cores V, H, A, but coupling into
D. Eve’s damaging laser source can be manually inserted in place of the scanning source.
Att., attenuator; PC, polarization controller. b, Spatial filter before and after damage.
Darkfield microphotographs show front view of the pinhole. See Supplementary Video 1
for real-time recording of laser damage to the pinhole inside Bob.
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Figure 4.8: Efficiency-mismatch side-channel opened after laser damage in free-space QKD
system. Each pair of 3D–2D plots shows normalised photon detection efficiency η in a
receiver channel versus illuminating beam angles φ and θ. a, Before laser damage, the
angular dependence is essentially identical between the four channels [41]. Plot for one
channel (V) before damage is shown. b, After the laser damage, the four receiver channels
H, V, D, A exhibit unequal sensitivity to photons outside the middle area around φ = θ = 0.
The last plot shows angular ranges for targeting the four detectors that satisfy conditions
for the faked-state attack.
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Figure 4.9: Modelled QBER observed by Bob in free-space QKD system. The dotted
curve shows QBER without Eve. At lower channel loss, the QBER is due to imperfect
fidelity, while at higher channel loss Bob’s detector background counts become the domi-
nant contribution. The lower solid curve (blue) shows QBER under our attack when only
Bob’s sifted key rate is kept the same as before the attack. The upper solid curve (red)
additionally keeps the same sifted key rates conditioned on each polarization sent by Alice,
which more closely mimics a realistic system operation.
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4.2.2 Finite key size attack
Motivation
The finite key size analysis on QKD system has been established and developed for many
years [30, 47, 48]. Unfortunately, many QKD schemes, especially the scheme that went
commercialized, still neglected this effect and employs only asymptotic key analysis on
their systems. Some did it without realizing the effect while some just claim that that
their raw key size is large enough to neglect the finite-key-size effect on their security. In
the case of Clavis2, IDQ implemented this system when finite-key-size analysis for BB84
protocol was not available.
This study is aimed to emphasize the significance of finite-key-size effects on a practical
system. The goal is to demonstrate the ability of Eve to force the system to generate a
secret key from a raw key size that is smaller than which was predicted in the system
design. As a result, the asymptotic limit employed in the system might no longer hold.
My contribution to this experiment is as follows:
(First measurements on unpatched system were done by Sajeed)
-Studied finite key-size analysis
-Data processing
Second experiment, testing ID Quantique’s software update
-Studied the updated software
-Set up and re-run the experiment
-Data processing
-Wrote the manuscript
Method
Under normal operation, the system exchanges the quantum signal and saves the raw key
until the memory buffers in Alice and Bob are filled. Then, they perform sifting, error
correction and privacy amplification. [44, 42]. One of the features of Clavis2 is that the
system will terminate the raw key exchange process when the photon detection efficiency
in the quantum channel drops below a certain value, and perform the post-processing from
the raw key already exchanged until then. This feature was implemented to compensate
the drift of timing alignment of detector gates [43]. Since the security proof of the system
did not take account the statistical deviation of non-infinite key length, if Eve can force
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the system to generate secret keys from a shorter raw key length, the security proof would
no longer apply.
To demonstrate the ability of Eve to force the system to work with a small key length, we
began our experiment by setting the system in a normal operation. A variable attenuator
was inserted in between the quantum channel. The attenuator was set to 0dB at the
beginning. During the raw-key exchange phase, we let the system exchange the raw-key
for a set period then change the value of the variable attenuator to induce a 40dB-loss
in the fiber. This reduced the detection efficiency in Bob and forced the process to be
terminated and began the post-processing. For all non-zero distilled keys, we recorded the
length of the sifted key, the number of bits disclosed in the error correction, the error rate,
and length of secret key reported by the system. We varied the duration of each raw key
exchange to correct the parameter for various lengths of sifted key. We found that the
length of distilled key was decreased as the length of sifted key decreased. Next step is to
verify if this data falls under the theoretical bound.
Result
We compared the experiment’s result with the asymptotic key rate equation 3.2 and finite
key rate equation 3.3. After substituting the parameters from the experiment into the
equation, we obtained a lower bound of secret key length as shown in Fig.4.10. The blue
line was calculated under the asymptotic assumption as used in the system’s protocol. The
red and black line is the bound of secret key rate under the finite-key size assumption (the
area below each line given the secure zone correspond to the security conditions applied
to that plot). It can be seen from 4.10 that the experimentally distilled key-size from the
system, green ×, satisfied the security criteria for the asymptotic assumption. However,
the experiment result fall out of bound of finite-key size analysis upto security parameter
 = 10−1. As a result, security of the system is not covered by this security proof.
In the middle of our study, IDQ has released a new patch for Clavis2. This patch
reduced the QBER and let the system perform post-processing only when the sifted key
in the memory exceed a threshold of around 1 million bits. We perform our experiment
and recalculated our plot using the new parameters acquired from the system. The result
showed that the distilled key is within the secure bound (see Fig 4.11). By the time of
submitting this thesis, the manuscript is being reviewed by co-authors. the current version
of the manuscript can be seen in Appendix B.3
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Figure 4.10: Secret key rate vs raw key rate. Blue dashed line is the infinite key bound.
Red dotted line is finite-key size bound with  = 10−10. Black-line is finite-key-size bound
with  = 10−1. Green dots are experimental results with 3 dB line loss and 5.2% error rate.
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Figure 4.11: Experiment result with the new software. Blue line is the infinite key bound.
Red-dotted line is finite-key size bound with  = 10−10. Green × are experiment results.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis I have performed three experiments that showed ability of Eve to manipulate
the system so that the she gain more information about the key than what Alice and Bob
expected. The first experiment was a spatial-mode detection-efficiency-mismatch where
Eve take control the path of the beam and manipulate the probability of detection in
each detector, which would allows her to perform intercept-and-resent attack successfully.
Second experiment was Laser damage attack, in which Eve employs high-power laser to
alter the property of pinhole that was used as a countermeasure for the efficiency mismatch
attack. We showed that Eve successfully recover her attack ability without damaging other
devices in the receiver. The third experiment was a demonstration of Eve’s ability to force
QKD a system to generate secret key out of raw key in finite key regime in which the
asymptotic security analysis employed by the system might not hold.
I hope that this work will emphasize the necessity of investigating physical side-channels
in every implementation of QKD. Furthermore I also believe that the iterations of finding
vulnerabilities and testing countermeasures should eventually guarantee the high level of
security promised by the theory of QKD.
5.1 Recommendations and outlook
5.1.1 Detection-efficiency mismatch
• This is a test of a laboratory prototype model of receiver. A test on real devices that
are going to be used in long distance QKD or satellite communication is needed.
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• Real-life free-space communication suffered from atmospheric turbulence. This sub-
ject need to be study on both Alice and Bob key distribution and its effect on Eve’s
attack.
5.1.2 Laser damage
• This is a test on specific type of pinhole material. The effect of high-power laser on
difference spacial filter materials is required.
5.1.3 Finite-key-size attack
• As was shown that the security analysis might no long hold under this attack, an
explicit attack that take advantage of this scheme to gain information about the key
is left for further study.
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Appendix A
Technical details
This section contains technical details of the experiments in Chapter 4. This consists of
source codes that I developed to control the devices and post processing.
To acquire the detection efficiency of each channel in the receiver at each specific angle
of incoming photon, this experiment require automated control of the translation stage and
data acquisition. For this experiment, only computer was used to control both translation
stage in the emitter side, and counters which connected to APDs in the receiver side in
order to simplify the synchronization processes. All data acquisition and post processing
are programmed on Matlab.
A.1 Experiment
The experiment started by established the connection between computer, translation stage,
and counters via USB port. Next was a manual setup before the scan. First, we performed
a fine alignment between the emitter and receiver to mimic Alice and Bob setup, by send
the beam through the center of receiver and maximize the photon count rate on all four
APD. The final coordinate of translation stage after this step was used as a reference point
for the scan (position φ = 0, θ = 0). After that, we moved the translation stage along
φ axis until the beam fail off the objective lens of the receiver, record that distance ∆φ
from the center. The distance was divided into 50 parts which determined step size of the
scan. From here, the ’position’ will be defined as a multiplication of this step size. These
parameters from this step were put in the program for automated scan. For more detail,
please see comments on the code A.1.
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Listing A.1: Matlab code for translation stage control and data acquisition in detection
efficiency mismatch experiment
1
2 clear ; close a l l ; clc ;
3 global hy hx hz ; % make h a g l o b a l v a r i a b l e so i t can be used
out s id e the main
4
5 %% Create Matlab Figure Container
6 fpos = get (0 , ’ De fau l tF igu r ePos i t i on ’ ) ; % f i g u r e d e f a u l t
p o s i t i o n
7 fpos (3 ) = 650 ; % f i g u r e window s i z e ; Width
8 fpos (4 ) = 450 ; % Height
9 global ack
10 ack =0;
11 fy = f igure ( ’ Po s i t i on ’ , fpos , . . .
12 ’Menu ’ , ’None ’ , . . .
13 ’Name ’ , ’APT GUI ’ ) ;
14 %% Create ActiveX C o n t r o l l e r
15 hy = a c t x c o n t r o l ( ’MGMOTOR. MGMotorCtrl . 1 ’ , [ 2 0 20 600 400 ] , fy ) ;
16
17 fx = f igure ( ’ Po s i t i on ’ , fpos , . . .
18 ’Menu ’ , ’None ’ , . . .
19 ’Name ’ , ’APT GUI ’ ) ;
20 %% Create ActiveX C o n t r o l l e r
21 hx = a c t x c o n t r o l ( ’MGMOTOR. MGMotorCtrl . 1 ’ , [ 2 0 20 600 400 ] , fx ) ;
22
23 f z = f igure ( ’ Po s i t i on ’ , fpos , . . .
24 ’Menu ’ , ’None ’ , . . .
25 ’Name ’ , ’APT GUI ’ ) ;
26 %% Create ActiveX C o n t r o l l e r
27 hz = a c t x c o n t r o l ( ’MGMOTOR. MGMotorCtrl . 1 ’ , [ 2 0 20 600 400 ] , f z ) ;
28
29 %% I n i t i a l i z e
30 % Star t Control
31 hx . S t a r t C t r l ;
32 hy . S t a r t C t r l ;
33 hz . S t a r t C t r l ;
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34 % Set the S e r i a l Port Number
35 SNx = 90847260;
36 SNy = 90847261;
37 SNz = 90847262; % put in the s e r i a l number o f the hardware
38 set (hx , ’HWSerialNum ’ , SNx) ;
39 set (hy , ’HWSerialNum ’ , SNy) ;
40 set ( hz , ’HWSerialNum ’ , SNz) ;
41
42 % I n d e n t i f y the dev i ce
43 hx . I d e n t i f y ;
44 hy . I d e n t i f y ;
45 hz . I d e n t i f y ;
46
47 pause (3 ) ; % wai t ing f o r the GUI to load up ;
48 %% Cont ro l l i ng the Hardware
49 %h . MoveHome(0 , 0 ) ; % Home the s tage . F i r s t 0 i s the channel ID (
channel 1)
50 % second 0 i s to move immediately
51 %% Event Handling
52 hx . r e g i s t e r e v e n t ({ ’ MoveComplete ’ ’ MoveCompleteHandler ’ }) ;
53 hy . r e g i s t e r e v e n t ({ ’ MoveComplete ’ ’ MoveCompleteHandler ’ }) ;
54 hz . r e g i s t e r e v e n t ({ ’ MoveComplete ’ ’ MoveCompleteHandler ’ }) ;
55
56 %% Sending Moving Commands
57 timeout = 10 ; % timeout f o r wai t ing the move to be completed
58
59 optx= . 3 9 6 ;
60 opty= . 4 8 1 ;
61 optz= . 8 2 7 ;
62 s canS i z e = . 0 5 ;
63 scanStep = . 0 0 1 ;
64
65
66 row =1;
67 c o l =1;
68
69 format long ;
70
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71 hy . SetAbsMovePos (0 , opty ) ;
72 hy . MoveAbsolute (0 , opty ) ;
73 %pause f o r ack
74 while ˜ack pause ( 0 . 0 1 ) ; end
75 ack =0;
76 pause ( 0 . 1 ) ;%pause f o r v i b r a t i o n
77 hx . SetAbsMovePos (0 , optx ) ;
78 hx . MoveAbsolute (0 , optx ) ;
79 while ˜ack pause ( 0 . 0 1 ) ; end
80 ack =0;
81 pause ( 0 . 1 ) ;
82 hz . SetAbsMovePos (0 , optz ) ;
83 hz . MoveAbsolute (0 , optz ) ;
84 while ˜ack pause ( 0 . 0 1 ) ; end
85 ack =0;
86 pause ( 0 . 1 ) ;
87
88 %%%%PORT INITIATE%%%%%%%
89 d1 = s e r i a l ( ’COM7’ ) ;
90 d2 = s e r i a l ( ’COM8’ ) ;
91 d3 = s e r i a l ( ’COM9’ ) ;
92 d4 = s e r i a l ( ’COM10 ’ ) ;
93
94 fopen ( d1 ) ;
95 fopen ( d2 ) ;
96 fopen ( d3 ) ;
97 fopen ( d4 ) ;
98
99 fpr intf ( d1 , ’MODE0’ ) ; %MODE 0 − TIME COUNTING
100 fpr intf ( d1 , ’AUTM0’ ) ;
101 %f p r i n t f ( sport , ’ SRCE1’ ) ; %SOURCE: 0A AND 1B
102 fpr intf ( d1 , ’LEVL1, 1 ’ ) ;
103 fpr intf ( d1 , ’LEVL2, 1 ’ ) ;
104 fpr intf ( d1 , ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
105 fpr intf ( d1 , ’GATE0. 1 ’ ) ;
106 fpr intf ( d1 , ’DISP0 ’ ) ;
107
108 fpr intf ( d2 , ’MODE0’ ) ; %MODE 0 − TIME COUNTING
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109 fpr intf ( d2 , ’AUTM0’ ) ;
110 %f p r i n t f ( sport , ’ SRCE1’ ) ; %SOURCE: 0A AND 1B
111 fpr intf ( d2 , ’LEVL1, 1 ’ ) ;
112 fpr intf ( d2 , ’LEVL2, 1 ’ ) ;
113 fpr intf ( d2 , ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
114 fpr intf ( d2 , ’GATE0. 1 ’ ) ;
115 fpr intf ( d2 , ’DISP0 ’ ) ;
116
117 fpr intf ( d3 , ’MODE0’ ) ; %MODE 0 − TIME COUNTING
118 fpr intf ( d3 , ’AUTM0’ ) ;
119 %f p r i n t f ( sport , ’ SRCE1’ ) ; %SOURCE: 0A AND 1B
120 fpr intf ( d3 , ’LEVL1, 1 ’ ) ;
121 fpr intf ( d3 , ’LEVL2, 1 ’ ) ;
122 fpr intf ( d3 , ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
123 fpr intf ( d3 , ’GATE0. 1 ’ ) ;
124 fpr intf ( d3 , ’DISP0 ’ ) ;
125
126 fpr intf ( d4 , ’MODE0’ ) ; %MODE 0 − TIME COUNTING
127 fpr intf ( d4 , ’AUTM0’ ) ;
128 %f p r i n t f ( sport , ’ SRCE1’ ) ; %SOURCE: 0A AND 1B
129 fpr intf ( d4 , ’LEVL1, 1 ’ ) ;
130 fpr intf ( d4 , ’LEVL2, 1 ’ ) ;
131 fpr intf ( d4 , ’ SIZE1 ’ ) ;
132 fpr intf ( d4 , ’GATE0. 1 ’ ) ;
133 fpr intf ( d4 , ’DISP0 ’ ) ;
134
135 %%%%%%%%%%%%+======END PORT INITIALIZE====%%%%%%%%
136
137 %%%%Begin Scan
138 f i n y = opty+scanS i z e ;
139 beginy = opty−s canS i z e ;
140 f i n z = optz+scanS i z e ;
141 beg inz = optz−s canS i z e ;
142
143 for yPos = beginy : scanStep : f i n y ;
144 hy . SetAbsMovePos (0 , yPos ) ;
145 hy . MoveAbsolute (0 , yPos ) ;
146 while ˜ack pause ( 0 . 0 1 ) ; end
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147 ack =0;
148 pause ( 0 . 1 ) ;
149 %disp ( time )
150 for zPos = beginz : scanStep : f i n z ;
151 hz . SetAbsMovePos (0 , zPos ) ;
152 hz . MoveAbsolute (0 , zPos ) ;
153 while ˜ack pause ( 0 . 0 1 ) ; end
154 ack =0;
155 pause ( 0 . 1 ) ;
156 disp ( yPos ) ;
157 disp ( zPos ) ;
158
159 fpr intf ( d1 , ’MEAS?0 ’ ) ;
160 det1 ( row , c o l ) = fscanf ( d1 , ’%g ’ ) ;
161
162 fpr intf ( d2 , ’MEAS?0 ’ ) ;
163 det2 ( row , c o l ) = fscanf ( d2 , ’%g ’ ) ;
164
165 fpr intf ( d3 , ’MEAS?0 ’ ) ;
166 det3 ( row , c o l ) = fscanf ( d3 , ’%g ’ ) ;
167
168 fpr intf ( d4 , ’MEAS?0 ’ ) ;
169 det1 ( row , c o l ) = fscanf ( d4 , ’%g ’ ) ;
170 %det4 ( row , c o l )
171 row = row+1;
172 end
173 row =1;
174 c o l = c o l +1;
175
176 end
177
178 fc lose ( i n s t r f i n d ) ;
179
180 f igure (5 ) ;
181 mesh( det1 ) ;
182 f igure (6 )
183 mesh( det2 ) ;
184 f igure (7 ) ;
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185 mesh( det3 ) ;
186 f igure (8 ) ;
187 mesh( det4 ) ;
188
189 f i l ename = ’2014−06−10−noPinHole 50umCore 2 noEpd . x l sx ’ ;
190 x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , det1 , ’ Sheet1 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
191 x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , det2 , ’ Sheet2 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
192 x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , det3 , ’ Sheet3 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
193 x l s w r i t e ( f i l ename , det4 , ’ Sheet4 ’ , ’A1 ’ ) ;
194 disp ( ’ Scan Fin i shed ’ )
A.2 Post processing
After acquired the count rate for each angle, we searched for specific angles that causes
detection efficiency mismatch for each polarization orientation using code A.3. The goal is
tho find an angle that yield highest efficiency ratio δj and absolute efficiency ηj defined in
section 4.1.2.
Listing A.2: Matlab code for mismatch angle finding.
1 %−−−−−===== mismatchFinding =====−−−−−
2 % Code to f i n d mismatch area
3 clear ; clear a l l ; clc ;
4
5 p = x l s r e ad ( ’ APDcor rec t i on po ly8 f i t . x l sx ’ ) ;
6
7 f i leName = ’ 2014−08−18. x l sx ’ ;
8 det d = x l s r e ad ( fi leName , ’ Sheet1 ’ ) ;
9 det a = x l s r e ad ( fi leName , ’ Sheet2 ’ ) ;
10 det h = x l s r e ad ( fi leName , ’ Sheet3 ’ ) ;
11 det v = x l s r e ad ( fi leName , ’ Sheet4 ’ ) ;
12
13 det d = c o r r e c t i o n ( det d , p ( 2 , 2 : 1 0 ) ) ;
14 det a = c o r r e c t i o n ( det a , p ( 4 , 2 : 1 0 ) ) ;
15 det h = c o r r e c t i o n ( det h , p ( 3 , 2 : 1 0 ) ) ;
16 det v = c o r r e c t i o n ( det v , p ( 1 , 2 : 1 0 ) ) ;
17
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18 %normal ize the count to get r i d o f the e f f e c t o f e l l i p t i c a l −
p o l a r i z a t i o n o f the l a s e r source .
19 det d = det d /max(max( det d ) ) ;
20 det a = det a /max(max( det a ) ) ;
21 det h = det h /max(max( det h ) ) ;
22 det v = det v /max(max( det v ) ) ;
23
24 det hh = det h ( 3 : 9 9 , 3 : 9 9 ) ;
25 det vv = det v ( 3 : 9 9 , 3 : 9 9 ) ;
26 det dd = det d ( 3 : 9 9 , 3 : 9 9 ) ;
27 det aa = det a ( 3 : 9 9 , 3 : 9 9 ) ;
28
29
30
31 dataS i ze = s ize ( det hh ) ;
32
33 %Set mismatch parameters
34 h th r e sho ld = 0 . 2 ; % r a t i o th r e sho ld compare to the cent e r peak
35 v th r e sho ld = . 0 0 2 ;
36 d th r e sho ld = . 0 8 ;
37 a t h r e s h o l d = 0 . 0 0 1 ;
38 r a t i o h = 100 ; % r a t i o th r e sho ld compare to other two channel in
the d i f f e r e n t b a s i s
39 r a t i o v = 1 . 0 1 ;
40 r a t i o d = 40 ;
41 r a t i o a = 1 . 1 3 ;
42 e h = 100 ; % r a t i o th r e sho ld compare to the orthogona l
p o l a r i z a t i o n
43 e v = 2 ;
44 e d = 30 ;
45 e a = 1 . 1 5 ;
46
47 %f i n d the mismatch po in t s and pa int that coord inate with
r e s p e c t i v e c o l o r
48 for i = 1 : dataS ize (1 )
49 for j = 1 : dataS ize (2 )
50 i f ( ( det h ( i , j ) > h th r e sho ld ) && ( ( det h ( i , j ) / det d ( i , j )
) > r a t i o h ) . . .
52
51 && ( ( det h ( i , j ) / det a ( i , j ) ) > r a t i o h ) && ( ( det h
( i , j ) / det v ( i , j ) ) > e h ) )
52 b ia s ( i , j ) = 10000 ; % value correspond to a c o l o r in
s u r f a c e p l o t
53
54 e l s e i f ( ( det v ( i , j ) > v th r e sho ld ) && ( det v ( i , j ) / det d ( i
, j ) > r a t i o v ) . . .
55 && ( det v ( i , j ) / det a ( i , j ) > r a t i o v ) && ( det v ( i ,
j ) / det h ( i , j ) > e v ) )
56 b ia s ( i , j ) = 8000 ;
57
58 e l s e i f ( ( det d ( i , j ) > d th r e sho ld ) && ( det d ( i , j ) / det h ( i
, j ) > r a t i o d ) . . .
59 && ( det d ( i , j ) / det v ( i , j ) > r a t i o d ) && ( det d ( i ,
j ) / det a ( i , j ) > e d ) )
60 b ia s ( i , j ) = 6000 ;
61
62 e l s e i f ( ( det a ( i , j ) > a t h r e s h o l d ) && ( det a ( i , j ) / det h ( i
, j ) > r a t i o a ) . . .
63 && ( det a ( i , j ) / det v ( i , j ) > r a t i o a ) && ( det a ( i ,
j ) / det d ( i , j ) > e a ) )
64 b ia s ( i , j ) = 4000 ;
65 else
66 b ia s ( i , j ) = 0 ;
67
68 end
69 end
70 end
71
72 surf ( b i a s ) %p lo t the r e s u l t
73
74 %−−−−−===== end mismatchFinding =====−−−−−
For j-polarization, the search performed manually by first set jthreshold = 0, ej =
ratioj = 1000, then decreased ratiojandej until we found a group of adjacent points (area)
that satisfied the condition for that polarization. We search for an ’area’ instead of ’point’
to neglect the effect of noise spike in the low-count-rate region. After that, we increased
jthreshold until the area shrank down to a group of 5-10 points. Use that final value of
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jthreshold, ej, andratioj for optimization.
Next program is an optimization program to determine the success of Eve’s attack on
the system. The model of the attack was stated in section 4.1.2. Eve’s attack is success if
she can match the detection rate predicted by Alice and Bob, with error under a certain
threshold. The following is an optimization program I developed independently. Goal of
this program was to find a set of mean photon number sent by Eve for each polarization
orientation, which optimized the detection rate of Bob while limited the error rate below
a certain threshold. This program capable of handle the model where Eve use photon-
number-state with arbitrary distribution. But in this case, we assumed that Eve’s photon
source followed Poisson distribution. This was different from the final program stated in
section 4.1.2 and [41]. The reason was that, at the mismatch angles, the detection efficiency
of Bob was lower compared to the ideal case at the center. At first, we did not know how
much detection rate Eve could generate and whether the rate could keep up with Bob’s
expectation from the channel without Eve.
Listing A.3: Matlab code for mismatch angle finding.
1 %−−−−−=====Main=====−−−−−−
2 %main program
3 clear ; clear a l l ;
4
5 −−−set va r i ab l e s−−−
6 nCrTmp = zeros (101 ,101) ; %Combination func t i on
7 for i = 0 :100
8 for j = 0 : i
9 nCrTmp( i +1, j +1)= nCr ( i , j ) ;
10 end
11 end
12 global nCrTmp ;
13
14 ub = Inf ( 4 , 1 ) ;
15 ub ( : ) =100;
16 lb = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
17 b = 0 ;
18 Aeq = zeros ( 1 , 4 ) ;
19 mu0 = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
20 mu = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
21
22 −−−opt imizat ion−−−
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23 opt ions = opt imopt ions ( ’ fmincon ’ , ’ U s ePa ra l l e l ’ , t rue ) ; %enable
multi−CPU c a l c u l a t i o n
24
25 mu = fmincon ( @rateOpt , mu0 , Aeq , b , Aeq , b , lb , ub , @rateCon , opt ions ) %
c a l l opt imiza t i on funct ion , fmincon , to f i n d s e t o f mean
photon number , mu, that opt imize d e t e c t i o n ra t e in rateOpt
module , under the c o n s t r a i n t de f ined in rateCon module .
26
27 e ta s =
{ 0 . 0 2 , 0 . 0 , 0 . 0 0 1 5 , 0 . 0 0 2 ; 0 , 0 . 0 1 , 0 . 0 0 2 5 , 0 . 0 0 1 2 ; 0 . 0 0 7 5 , 0 . 0 0 7 , 0 . 0 3 , 0 ; 0 . 0 0 6 , 0 . 0 0 3 , 0 , 0 . 0 9} ;
%e f f i c i e n c y mismatch parameters from the experiment
28
29 −−−c a l c u l a t e opt imized key ra t e and error rate−−−
30 HIn = detRate1 (mu(1) , e ta s {1 ,1} , e t a s {1 ,3} , e t a s {1 ,4}) ;
31 VIn = detRate1 (mu(2) , e ta s {2 ,2} , e t a s {2 ,3} , e t a s {2 ,4}) ;
32 DIn = detRate1 (mu(3) , e t a s {3 ,3} , e t a s {3 ,1} , e t a s {3 ,2}) ;
33 AIn = detRate1 (mu(4) , e ta s {4 ,4} , e t a s {4 ,1} , e t a s {4 ,2}) ;
34 H = (HIn (1)/2+DIn (3)/2+AIn (4 ) /2) /4 ;
35 V = (VIn (1)/2+DIn (3)/2+AIn (4 ) /2) /4 ;
36 D = (HIn (3 )/2+VIn (4 )/2+DIn (1) /2) /4 ;
37 A = (HIn (3)/2+VIn (4 )/2+AIn (1 ) /2) /4 ;
38 rateTot = H+V+D+A
39 errRate = (HIn (3)+HIn (4 )+VIn (3)+VIn (4 )+DIn (3 )+DIn (4 )+AIn (3 )+AIn
(4 ) ) /4/2/2/ rateTot %denominators are Al iceBitChoice , evePick ,
incompBasis
40
41 %−−−−−=====end Main=====−−−−−−
42
43 %−−−−−=====detRate1=====−−−−−−
44 %d e t e c t i o n ra t e c a l c u l a t i o n module . Get mean photon number (mu)
and mismatch parameters ( eta ) , then c a l c u l a t e d e t e c t i o n ra t e
f o r the channel that match incoming photon p o l a r i z a t i o n (
th i sRate ) , the orthogona l channel ( ortRate ) , and two other
channel in the other b a s i s ( oth1Rate , oth2Rate )
45 function x = detRate1 (mu, etaThis , etaOth1 , etaOth2 )
46
47 global nCrTmp
48
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49 th i sRate = 0 ; %i n i t i a l background count ra t e
50 ortRate = 0 ;
51 oth1Rate = 0 ;
52 oth2Rate = 0 ;
53
54 %−−−c a l c u l a t e key ra t e us ing equat ion 4.1−−−
55 for n = 1:50
56 nRate = muˆn∗exp(−mu) / f a c t o r i a l (n) ;
57 for m = 0 : n
58 dummyH = 0 ;
59 dummyD = 0 ;
60 dummyA = 0 ;
61 for l = 0 : ( n−m)
62 dummyH = dummyH+(nCrTmp(n−m+1, l +1) ) ∗ ( 0 . 5 ˆ ( n−m) ) ∗((1−
etaOth1 ) ˆ(n−m−l ) ) ∗((1− etaOth2 ) ˆ l ) ;
63 dummyD = dummyD+(nCrTmp(n−m+1, l +1) ) ∗ ( 0 . 5 ˆ ( n−m) )
∗(1−(1−etaOth1 ) ˆ(n−m−l ) ) ∗((1− etaOth2 ) ˆ l +0.5∗(1−(1−
etaOth2 ) ˆ l ) ) ;
64 dummyA = dummyA+(nCrTmp(n−m+1, l +1) ) ∗ ( 0 . 5 ˆ ( n−m) )
∗(1−(1−etaOth2 ) ˆ( l ) ) ∗((1− etaOth1 ) ˆ(n−m−l )
+0.5∗(1−(1−etaOth1 ) ˆ(n−m−l ) ) ) ;
65 end
66 th i sRate = th i sRate+nRate ∗(nCrTmp(n+1,m+1) ) ∗ (0 . 5ˆ n)
∗((1−(1− etaThis ) ˆm) )∗dummyH;
67 oth1Rate = oth1Rate+nRate ∗(nCrTmp(n+1,m+1) ) ∗ (0 . 5ˆ n) ∗((1−
etaThis ) ˆm) ∗(dummyD) ;
68 oth2Rate = oth2Rate+nRate ∗(nCrTmp(n+1,m+1) ) ∗ (0 . 5ˆ n) ∗((1−
etaThis ) ˆm) ∗(dummyA) ;
69 end
70 end
71 x = [ thisRate , ortRate , oth1Rate , oth2Rate ] ;
72 %−−−−−=====end detRate1=====−−−−−−
73
74 %−−−−−=====rateOpt=====−−−−−−
75 %c a l c u l a t e 1−( d e t e c t i o n ra t e ) f o r the minimizat ion program
76
77 function rateTot = rateOpt (mu)
78 global nCrTmp ;
56
79 global e ta s ;
80 for i = 0 :100
81 for j = 0 : i
82 nCrTmp( i +1, j +1)= nCr ( i , j ) ;
83 end
84 end
85
86 e ta s =
{ 0 . 0 2 , 0 . 0 , 0 . 0 0 1 5 , 0 . 0 0 2 ; 0 , 0 . 0 1 , 0 . 0 0 2 5 , 0 . 0 0 1 2 ; 0 . 0 0 7 5 , 0 . 0 0 7 , 0 . 0 3 , 0 ; 0 . 0 0 6 , 0 . 0 0 3 , 0 , 0 . 0 9} ;
87
88 HIn = detRate1 (mu(1) , e t a s {1 ,1} , e t a s {1 ,3} , e t a s {1 ,4}) ;
89 VIn = detRate1 (mu(2) , e t a s {2 ,2} , e t a s {2 ,3} , e t a s {2 ,4}) ;
90 DIn = detRate1 (mu(3) , e t a s {3 ,3} , e t a s {3 ,1} , e t a s {3 ,2}) ;
91 AIn = detRate1 (mu(4) , e t a s {4 ,4} , e t a s {4 ,1} , e t a s {4 ,2}) ;
92 H = (HIn (1 )/2+DIn (3)/2+AIn (4 ) /2) /4 ;
93 V = (VIn (1 )/2+DIn (3)/2+AIn (4 ) /2) /4 ;
94 D = (HIn (3 )/2+VIn (4)/2+DIn (1) /2) /4 ;
95 A = (HIn (3 )/2+VIn (4 )/2+AIn (1) /2) /4 ;
96 rateTot = 1−(H+V+D+A) ;
97
98 %−−−−−=====end rateOpt=====−−−−−−
99
100 %−−−−−=====rateCon=====−−−−−−
101 %Constra int module . To make sure that Eve induce e r r o r r a t e lower
than the th r e sho ld ( errTh ) , t h i s module c a l c u l a t e c = ( e r r o r
r a t e )−(errTh ) to be used as c o n s t r a i n t c<=0 in the
opt imiza t i on program .
102 function [ c , ceq ] = rateCon (mu)
103 global nCrTmp ;
104 global e ta s ;
105
106 errTh = 0 . 3 ;
107
108 HIn = keyRate1 (mu(1) , e t a s {1 ,1} , e t a s {1 ,3} , e t a s {1 ,4}) ;
109 VIn = keyRate1 (mu(2) , e t a s {2 ,2} , e t a s {2 ,3} , e t a s {2 ,4}) ;
110 DIn = keyRate1 (mu(3) , e ta s {3 ,3} , e t a s {3 ,1} , e t a s {3 ,2}) ;
111 AIn = keyRate1 (mu(4) , e t a s {4 ,4} , e t a s {4 ,1} , e t a s {4 ,2}) ;
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112 H = (HIn (1 )/2+DIn (3)/2+AIn (4 ) /2) /4 ;
113 V = (VIn (1 )/2+DIn (3)/2+AIn (4 ) /2) /4 ;
114 D = (HIn (3 )/2+VIn (4)/2+DIn (1) /2) /4 ;
115 A = (HIn (3 )/2+VIn (4 )/2+AIn (1) /2) /4 ;
116
117 ceq = 0 ;
118 rateTot = H+V+D+A
119 c = (HIn (3 )+HIn (4 )+VIn (3 )+VIn (4 )+DIn (3 )+DIn (4 )+AIn (3 )+AIn (4) )
/4/2/2/ rateTot−errTh ; %e r r o r rate−th r e sho ld
120 %−−−−−=====end rateCon=====−−−−−−
The result showed that, for an ideal channel without noise and transmission loss, Eve
able to find set of mean photon number that produce detection rate at Bob higher than
0.5, while induced error rate lower than 0.02. From this result, we shifted our focus to an
optimization program that match Bob’s detection rate while minimize error rate as stated
in section 4.1.2 and [41], this program was developed with Shihan Sajeed. The photon-
number-state model in the previous program was used as a cross-check with the Poisson
distribution assumption used in the new program. Though it was not as efficient as the
new program, the program with photon-number-state shall be useful for future analysis
where one consider Eve with single photon source or source with non-Poisson statistics.
Listing A.4: Matlab code for error rate optimization (developed with Shihan Sajeed).
1 %−−−−===== Main =====−−−−−
2 % This i s the main program . I t uses three f u n c t i o n s f o r
opt imiza t i on
3 % get parameter s have a l l the data i n s i d e i t
4 % c o n s t r a i n t s have a l l the c o n s t r a i n t s r equ i r ed by the s o l v e r
5 % minimize e r r o r i s the f u n s t i o n that has the main o b j e c t i v e
func t i on as
6 % requ i r ed by the s o l v e r
7
8
9 % the r e s u l t a n t p l o t that t h i s program shows depends on two
cho i c e va lue s
10 % in func t i on c o n s t r a i n t s and min imize e r ro r
11
12 clear a l l ; clc ; format shortG ;
13
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14 global l o s s s % g l o b a l f unc t i on l o s s used by a l l the f u n c t i o n s
15 i = 1 ;
16 for l o s s s = 30 ; % choose a range o f l o s s e s
17
18 [ e ta t , eta d , eta0 , mu0 , eta , v b , v e , te , ne , pd b , pd e ] =
get parameter s ;
19
20 lb = zeros ( 4 , 1 ) ;
21 ub = i n f ( 4 , 1 ) ;
22 % f o r i n d i v i d u a l r a t e opt imiza t i on keep x0 =2;
23 % f o r t o t a l r a t e opt imiza t i on keep x0 =1;
24
25 x0 = 1∗ ones (4 , 1 ) ; % i n i t i a l guess
26
27 opt ions = optimset ( ’ Algorithm ’ , ’ i n t e r i o r−point ’ , ’ d i sp l ay ’ , ’ i t e r ’ )
; % opt ions f o r the s o l v e r
28 [mu, qber , e x i t f l a g , output ] = fmincon ( @minimize error , x0
, [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , [ ] , lb , ub , @constra ints , opt ions ) ; % c a l l the s o l v e r
fmincon
29 mus( i , 1 : 4 ) = mu; % the va lue s o f mu that matches r a t e s whi l e
minimizing qber
30 i t e r a t i o n s = output . i t e r a t i o n s ; %debuging purpose
31 [ c , ceq ( i , 1 : 4 ) , e r r o r s ( i , 1 : 5 ) ] = c o n s t r a i n t s (mu) ; %debuging purpose
32 d i f f a t t a c k ( i ) = .25∗ ( abs ( ceq ( i , 1 ) )+abs ( ceq ( i , 2 ) )+abs ( ceq ( i , 3 ) )+
abs ( ceq ( i , 4 ) ) ) ; %debuging purpose
33 check ( i ) = e x i t f l a g ; % e x i t f l a g that shows the cond i t i on o f
ending i t e r a t i o n ( check fmincon e x i t f l a g in mathworks webs i te
34 f i n a l l o s s ( i ) = l o s s s ; % x−va lues to p l o t
35 e r r ( i ) = qber ∗100 ; %y−va lue s to p l o t
36 i = i +1;
37 end
38
39 plot ( f i n a l l o s s , err , ’ r ’ , ’ Linewidth ’ , 4 ) ;
40
41 hold o f f ;
42 t i t l e ( ’ Loss ve r sus e r r o r curve ’ , ’ f o n t s i z e ’ , 26) ;
43 xlabel ( ’ Loss (db) ’ , ’ f o n t s i z e ’ , 18) ;
44 ylabel ( ’ e r r o r (%) ’ , ’ f o n t s i z e ’ ,18) ;
59
45 grid on ;
46
47
48 set ( f i n d a l l ( gcf , ’ type ’ , ’ axes ’ ) , ’ fontname ’ , ’ cambria ’ , ’ f o n t s i z e ’
, 16) ;
49
50 max( e r r )
51
52 %−−−−−=====end Main=====−−−−−
53
54 %−−−−−=====getParameter=====−−−−−
55 %Return a l l parameter needed f o r opt imiza t i on
56 function [ e t a t , eta b , eta 0 , mu0 , eta , v b , ve , te , e ta e , pd b ,
pd e ] = get parameter s
57
58 global l o s s s ;
59 %alpha = 1 ; %in db/km
60 e t a t = 10ˆ(− l o s s s /10) ; %l i n e t ransmi s s i on l o s s
61 eta b = . 7 ; % de t e c t o r e f f i c i e n c y in the middle
62 e ta 0 = e t a t ∗ e ta b ; % t o t a l l o s s
63 mu0 = e t a t ; % optimal mu chosen to be equal to l i n e t ransmi s s i on
l o s s
64
65
66 % p r a c t i c a l b ia sed po int data from the 2014−08−18. x s l x f i l e s
67 h th = 0 . 2 ;
68 v th = 0 . 0 0 2 ;
69 d th = 0 . 0 8 ;
70 a th = 0 . 0 0 1 ;
71 r h = 100 ;
72 r v = 1 . 0 1 ;
73 r d = 40 ;
74 r a = 1 . 1 3 ;
75 e h = 100 ;
76 e v = 2 ;
77 e d = 30 ;
78 e a = 1 . 1 5 ;
79
60
80 v b = . 9 9 ; %v i s i b i l i t y in Bob
81 ve = . 9 9 ; %v i s i b i l i t y Eve
82 te = 1 ; %l o s s e s in Eve
83 e t a e = . 8 5 ; %e f f c i c i e n c y o f Eve ’ s d e t e c t o r
84 pd b = 300∗1e−9;
85 pd e = 1∗1e−9;
86
87 %2014−07−18 data
88 eta (1 ) = h th ; %eta h h
89 eta (2 ) = h th / e h ; %eta v h
90 eta (3 ) = h th / r h ; %eta d h
91 eta (4 ) = h th / r h ; %eta a h
92
93 eta (5 ) = v th / e v ; %eta h v
94 eta (6 ) = v th ; %eta v v
95 eta (7 ) = v th / r v ; %eta d v
96 eta (8 ) = v th / r v ; %e t a a v
97
98
99 eta (9 ) = d th / r d ;%eta h d
100 eta (10) = d th / r d ;%eta v d
101 eta (11) = d th ; %eta d d
102 eta (12) = d th / e d ; %eta a d
103
104
105 eta (13) = a th / r a ;%eta h a
106 eta (14) = a th / r a ;%e t a v a
107 eta (15) = a th / e a ; %eta d a
108 eta (16) = a th ; %e t a a a
109
110 %−−−−−=====end getParameter=====−−−−−
111
112 %%−−−−−=====Constra int=====−−−−−
113 % t h i s part i s f o r prov id ing the ra t e c o n s t r a i n t s as r equ i r ed by
the
114 % fmincon func t ino .
115 %note that the e r r o r equat ions inc luded in t h i s code are only f o r
debugin
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116 %purposes . They can be de l e t ed i f r equ i r ed .
117
118 function [ c , ceq , e ] = c o n s t r a i n t s (mu)
119
120 % 1 = match t o t a l r a t e
121 % 2 = match i n d i v i d u a l r a t e s
122 cho i c e = 1 ; % choose whether to match t o t a l e r r o r r a t e ot
i n d i v i d u a l e r r o r r a t e s
123
124 [ e ta t , eta b , eta0 , mu0 , eta , v b , ve , te , e ta e , pd b , pd e ] =
get parameter s ;
125
126 p t ab = 1 − exp(−v b∗mu0∗ eta0 /2)+pd b ; %p r o b a b i l i t y that
t a r g e t de t e c t o r c l i c k s
127 p o ab = 1 − exp(−(1−v b )∗mu0∗ eta0 /2)+pd b ; %p r o b a b i l i t y that
orthogona l de t e c t o r c l i c k s
128 p x ab = 1 − exp(−.5∗mu0∗ eta0 /2)+pd b ; %p r o b a b i l i t y that other
b a s i s d e t e c t o r c l i c k s
129
130 % I n d i v i d u a l r a t e s when there i s no Eve
131 % rat e h ab means , r a t e when Al i c e send ’H’ and Bob measures in
HV b a s i s .
132 ra t e h ab = (1−p x ab )∗(1−p x ab ) ∗( p t ab + p t ab − p t ab ∗
p t ab ) ;
133 ra t e v ab = (1−p x ab )∗(1−p x ab ) ∗( p t ab + p t ab − p t ab ∗
p t ab ) ;
134 ra t e d ab = (1−p x ab )∗(1−p x ab ) ∗( p t ab + p t ab − p t ab ∗
p t ab ) ;
135 r a t e a a b = (1−p x ab )∗(1−p x ab ) ∗( p t ab + p t ab − p t ab ∗
p t ab ) ;
136 ra t e ab = ( ra t e h ab + ra t e v ab + rate d ab + r a t e a a b ) /4 ;
137
138 % The f o l l o w i n g four are c l i c k p r o b a b i l i t y when input ang le i s at
de t e c t o r H
139 % This part can be rep laced by detRate1 module from prev ious
program .
140 % p hh means c l i c k p r o b a i l i t y o f d e t e c t o r h when ang le i s towards
h
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141 p hh = 1 − exp(−mu(1) ∗ eta (1 ) ∗ e ta b /2) +pd b ;
142 p vh = 1 − exp(−mu(1) ∗ eta (2 ) ∗ e ta b /2) +pd b ;
143 p dh = 1 − exp(−mu(1) ∗ eta (3 ) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
144 p ah = 1 − exp(−mu(1) ∗ eta (4 ) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
145 % The f o l l o w i n g four are c l i c k p r o b a b i l i t y when input ang le i s at
de t e c t o r V
146 p hv = 1 − exp(−mu(2) ∗ eta (5 ) ∗ e ta b /2)+pd b ;
147 p vv = 1 − exp(−mu(2) ∗ eta (6 ) ∗ e ta b /2)+pd b ;
148 p dv = 1 − exp(−mu(2) ∗ eta (7 ) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
149 p av = 1 − exp(−mu(2) ∗ eta (8 ) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
150 % Fol lowing four are c l i c k p r o b a b i l i t y when input ang le i s at
de t e c t o r D
151 p hd = 1 − exp(−mu(3) ∗ eta (9 ) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
152 p vd = 1 − exp(−mu(3) ∗ eta (10) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
153 p dd = 1 − exp(−mu(3) ∗ eta (11) ∗ e ta b /2)+pd b ;
154 p ad = 1 − exp(−mu(3) ∗ eta (12) ∗ e ta b /2)+pd b ;
155 % Fol lowing four are c l i c k p r o b a b i l i t y when input ang le i s at
de t e c t o r A
156 p ha = 1 − exp(−mu(4) ∗ eta (13) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
157 p va = 1 − exp(−mu(4) ∗ eta (14) ∗ e ta b /4)+pd b ;
158 p da = 1 − exp(−mu(4) ∗ eta (15) ∗ e ta b /2)+pd b ;
159 p aa = 1 − exp(−mu(4) ∗ eta (16) ∗ e ta b /2)+pd b ;
160
161 %c a l c u l a t i n g the p r o b a b i l i t y o f d e t e c t i o n at a p a r t i c u l a r b a s i s
as a
162 %func t i on o f ang le
163
164 p hv h = ( p hh + p vh − p hh∗p vh )∗(1−p dh )∗(1−p ah ) ;
165 p da h = (1−p hh )∗(1−p vh ) ∗( p dh + p ah − p dh∗p ah ) ;
166
167 p hv v = ( p hv + p vv − p hv∗p vv )∗(1−p dv )∗(1−p av ) ;
168 p da v = (1−p hv )∗(1−p vv ) ∗( p dv + p av − p dv∗p av ) ;
169
170 p da d = (1−p hd )∗(1−p vd ) ∗( p dd + p ad − p dd∗p ad ) ;
171 p hv d = ( p hd + p vd − p hd∗p vd )∗(1−p dd )∗(1−p ad ) ;
172
173 p da a = (1−p ha )∗(1−p va ) ∗( p da + p aa − p da∗p aa ) ;
174 p hv a = ( p ha + p va − p ha∗p va )∗(1−p da )∗(1−p aa ) ;
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175
176 % eve d e t e c t i o n p r o b a b i l i t y
177 p r = pd e + 1 − exp(−mu0∗ te ∗ve∗ e t a e ) ;
178 p w = pd e + 1 − exp(−mu0∗ te ∗(1−ve )∗ e t a e ) ;
179 p x = pd e + 1 − exp(−mu0∗ te ∗ . 5∗ e t a e ) ;
180 %rat e in presence o f Eve
181 r a t e h e = .5∗ p r ∗p hv h + .5∗ p w∗p hv v + .5∗ p x∗p hv d + .5∗ p x
∗p hv a
182 r a t e v e = .5∗ p w∗p hv v + .5∗ p r ∗p hv v + .5∗ p x∗p hv d + .5∗ p x
∗p hv a
183 r a t e d e = .5∗ p r ∗p da d + .5∗ p w∗p da a + .5∗ p x∗p da h + .5∗ p x
∗p da v
184 r a t e a e = .5∗ p w∗p da d + .5∗ p r ∗p da a + .5∗ p x∗p da h + .5∗ p x
∗p da v
185
186 r a t e e = ( r a t e h e + r a t e v e + r a t e d e + r a t e a e ) /4 ;
187
188 %e r r o r c a l c u l a t i o n f o r H
189 p v h = ( p vh − p hh∗p vh /2)∗(1−p dh )∗(1−p ah ) ;
190 p v v = ( p vv − p hv∗p vv /2)∗(1−p dv )∗(1−p av ) ;
191 p v d = ( p vd − p hd∗p vd /2)∗(1−p dd )∗(1−p ad ) ;
192 p v a = ( p va − p ha∗p va /2)∗(1−p da )∗(1−p aa ) ;
193
194 %e r r o r c a l c u l a t i o n f o r V
195 p h h = ( p hh − p hh∗p vh /2)∗(1−p dh )∗(1−p ah ) ;
196 p h v = ( p hv − p hv∗p vv /2)∗(1−p dv )∗(1−p av ) ;
197 p h d = ( p hd − p hd∗p vd /2)∗(1−p dd )∗(1−p ad ) ;
198 p h a = ( p ha − p ha∗p va /2)∗(1−p da )∗(1−p aa ) ;
199
200 %e r r o r c a l c u l a t i o n f o r d
201 p a h = ( p ah − p dh∗p ah /2)∗(1−p hh )∗(1−p vh ) ;
202 p a v = ( p av − p dv∗p av /2)∗(1−p hv )∗(1−p vv ) ;
203 p a d = ( p ad − p dd∗p ad /2)∗(1−p hd )∗(1−p vd ) ;
204 p a a = ( p aa − p da∗p aa /2)∗(1−p ha )∗(1−p va ) ;
205
206 %e r r o r c a l c u l a t i o n f o r a
207 p d h = ( p dh − p dh∗p ah /2)∗(1−p hh )∗(1−p vh ) ;
208 p d v = ( p dv − p dv∗p av /2)∗(1−p hv )∗(1−p vv ) ;
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209 p d d = ( p dd − p dd∗p ad /2)∗(1−p hd )∗(1−p vd ) ;
210 p d a = ( p da − p da∗p aa /2)∗(1−p ha )∗(1−p va ) ;
211
212 % Error ra t e due to Eve
213 e h = . 5∗ ( p r ∗p v h + p w∗p v v + p x∗p v d + p x∗p v a ) ;
214 e v = . 5∗ ( p w∗p h h + p r ∗p h v + p x∗p h d + p x∗p h a ) ;
215 e d = . 5∗ ( p x∗p a h + p x∗p a v + p r ∗p a d + p w∗p a a ) ;
216 e a = . 5∗ ( p x∗p d h + p x∗p d v + p w∗p d d + p r ∗p d a ) ;
217
218 t o t a l e r r o r = .25∗ ( e h + e v + e d + e a ) ;
219
220 e (1 ) = e h / r a t e h e ;
221 e (2 ) = e v / r a t e v e ;
222 e (3 ) = e d / r a t e d e ;
223 e (4 ) = e a / r a t e a e ;
224 e (5 ) = t o t a l e r r o r / r a t e e ;
225
226 c = [ ] ;
227 i f ( cho i c e==1)
228 ceq (1 ) = rate ab − r a t e e ;
229 end
230
231 i f ( cho i c e==2)
232 ceq (1 ) = ra t e h ab − r a t e h e ;
233 ceq (2 ) = ra t e v ab − r a t e v e ;
234 ceq (3 ) = ra t e d ab − r a t e d e ;
235 ceq (4 ) = r a t e a a b − r a t e a e ;
236 end
237
238 %−−−−−=====end Constra int=====−−−−−
These same programs also used in laser damage experiment.
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In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver’s detector channels may depend
differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can control the spatial mode
to break security. We experimentally investigate a standard polarization QKD receiver and identify sources of
efficiency mismatch in its optical scheme. We model a practical intercept-and-resend attack and show that it
would break security in most situations. We show experimentally that adding an appropriately chosen spatial
filter at the receiver’s entrance may be an effective countermeasure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2], in theory, allows
two distant parties Alice and Bob to establish a shared secret
key with unconditional security [3–7]. Although a number
of successful implementations of QKD have been reported
[8–11] and commercialization is underway [12], the technol-
ogy has yet to achieve widespread use. One important reason
is that the maximum distance is still of the order of 300 km
[13] in fiber-based systems. Consequently, implementation of
free-space QKD utilizing ground-to-satellite links [14–22] that
promises long-distance quantum communication is now a very
attractive field of research.
Implementation imperfections have enabled a number of
successful attacks on QKD [23–31]. The main reason behind
this is the deviation of the actual behavior of the devices from
the ideal expected behavior. Thus, to guarantee the security,
it is of utmost importance to scrutinize the practical device
behavior for possible deviations. One such source of deviation
in free-space QKD can be the assumed symmetry of detection
efficiency among all received quantum states in Bob’s detec-
tor [28–30,32,33]. If a deviation from this assumption exists,
an adversary Eve can send light to Bob in different spatial
modes so that one of his detectors has a relatively higher
probability to click than the other detector(s) [34]. In this way,
she can exploit the mismatch in efficiency and make Bob’s
measurement outcome dependent on his measurement basis
and correlated to Eve, which breaks the assumptions of typical
security proofs. In this work, we investigate how crucial this
can be to the security of QKD.
We study a receiver designed for polarization encoding
free-space QKD, described in Sec. II. We test it in Sec. III by
sending an attenuated laser beam to the receiver with various
angle offsets and recording the relative detection probability
in each channel, with the goal being to find incidence angles
with high efficiency mismatch. With these data, we show in
Sec. IV by numerical modeling that an eavesdropper attack
*ssajeed@uwaterloo.ca
exists that enables Eve to steal the secret key. We discuss
countermeasures in Sec. V and conclude in Sec. VI.
II. QUANTUM-KEY-DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM UNDER TEST
A free-space QKD receiver typically employs a telescope
to reduce the size of a collimated beam, followed by a
nonpolarizing beam splitter to randomly choose between
two measurement bases. It is followed by polarization beam
splitters and single-photon detectors to measure photons in
the four states of polarization: horizontal (H), vertical (V),
+45◦ (D), and −45◦ (A) [14–22]. The receiver we test is
a prototype for a quantum communication satellite [36],
operating at 532 nm wavelength [Figs. 1(a) and 1(c)]. Its
telescope consists of a focusing lens L1 (diameter 50 mm, focal
length f = 250 mm; Thorlabs AC508-250-A) and collimating
lens L2 (f = 11 mm; Thorlabs A397TM-A). The collimated
beam of .2 mm diameter then passes through a 50:50 beam
splitter BS (custom pentaprism [36]) and pairs of polarization
beam splitters PBS1 and PBS2 (Thorlabs PBS121). PBS2
increases the polarization extinction ratio in the reflected arm
of PBS1. Lenses L3 (Thorlabs PAF-X-18-PC-A) focus the four
beams into 105-μm-core-diameter multimode fibers (Thorlabs
M43L01) leading to single-photon detectors (Excelitas SPCM-
AQRH-12-FC).
Long-distance free-space QKD receivers are multimode for
two reasons. First, propagation of Alice’s beam, initially single
mode, through a turbulent atmosphere splits it into multiple
spatial modes [37]. Second, the finite precision and speed
of real-time angular tracking of Alice’s beam requires that
Bob accepts multiple spatial modes in a certain acceptance
angle [18,19,22,38]. The use of single-mode fibers under
these conditions would lead to additional coupling losses
&10 dB [39] if the system does not include appropriate (and
often expensive) adaptive correction optics [37]. Therefore,
multimode fibers and detectors with larger area are generally
preferred because they allow good collection efficiency with-
out increasing complexity and cost.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Experimental setup. (a) Scheme of the experimental apparatus, top view (drawing not to scale). Eve’s source consists
of a fiber-coupled 532 nm laser, attenuator A, polarization controller PC, and a collimating lens mounted on a two-axis motorized translation
stage. The latter allows us to change the beam’s incidence angle and lateral displacement at Bob’s front lens L1 simultaneously. Green (light
gray) marginal rays parallel to the optical axis denote the original alignment of Alice’s beam to Bob. Red and blue (dark gray) marginal rays
show a scanning beam from Eve tilted at an angle (φ,θ ) relative to the original beam. Features – mark different transmission paths for
light inside Bob. (b) Normalized detection efficiency η in channel V versus the illumination angle (φ,θ ). This scan was taken to show the
features clearly by placing Eve at a closer distance. (c) Photograph of Bob’s receiver. The actual distance between facing surfaces of L2–BS is
42 mm, BS–PBS is 166 mm, PBS1–L is 331 mm, PBS1–PBS is 245 mm, PBS2–L is 310 mm in channel A and 5 mm in channel V.
III. EXPERIMENT
In order to exploit the mismatch in efficiency, Eve needs to
know the mismatch for the four detectors as a function of the
input angle. Hence, our first step was to scan Bob’s receiver
for possible efficiency mismatch. Eve’s source [Fig. 1(a)]
consists of a 532nm laser coupled into single-mode fiber,
attenuator A, polarization controller PC, and a collimating lens
L4 (Thorlabs C220TME-A) mounted on a two-axis motorised
translation stage (Thorlabs MAX343/M). In Fig. 1(a), green
(light gray) marginal rays denote the initial alignment from
Eve, replicating the alignment from Alice to Bob. This is
the initial position of the translation stage φ = θ = 0. As we
moved the stage in the transverse plane, it changed the beam’s
incidence angle and lateral displacement at Bob’s front lens
L1 simultaneously. This is shown by red (dark gray) marginal
rays in Fig. 1(a), representing a beam from Eve coming at an
angle (φ,θ ) relative to the initial beam.
Before scanning, the optics in Bob’s apparatus was aligned
to maximize coupling into all four detectors at the normal
incidence, which is the standard alignment procedure for
QKD. Note that many free-space QKD systems employ
a real-time tracking system to maintain this initial align-
ment [18,19,22,38]. We then started the scanning procedure
that involved first changing the outgoing-beam’s angle (φ,θ ),
and then recording the corresponding count rate at all four
detectors of Bob. For each data point, we used an integration
time of 1 s. Our scan consisted of approximately 100 × 100
data points in a square matrix covering the whole clear
aperture of Bob’s front lens L1. Then during postprocessing,
for each data point for each detector, we subtracted the
corresponding detector’s background count rate, and then
normalized it by dividing by the maximum count rate in that
detector.
At first, we did a preliminary scan using optical power
meters (Thorlabs PM200 with S130C head) that revealed
several features, highlighted in Fig. 1(b). Around φ = θ = 0,
maximum light coupling resulted in the central peak .
With increasing scanning angle, the focused beam started
missing the fiber core, and the detector count dropped off
. A region was found when the beam reflected off a
polished edge of PBS2 back into the fiber core, causing the
peak . Increasing the angle further made the beam hit the
anodized aluminum mount of L1 and possibly edges of other
lens mounts and round elements in the optical assembly.
It was scattered at these edges, producing two ring-like
features . Beyond these features, there were no noticeable
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Angular efficiency scan of the receiver, and points of interest. Four pairs of plots H, V, D, A shown in both
three-dimensions and two dimensions represent normalized detection efficiency in the four receiver channels versus illuminating beam angle
(φ,θ ). The angle φ = θ = 0 is the initial angle of QKD operation. The last plot shows angle ranges with a high mismatch, which is usable in
our attack.
power reading, as the beam completely missed the receiver
aperture.
We then adjusted the receiver setup to minimize the peak
and performed final scans at a distance of 26.1 m by using
Bob’s single-photon detectors (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-12-
FC). During these scans, the beam at L1 was Gaussian shaped
with 9 mm width (at 1/e2 peak intensity). The scans were done
in 38.3μrad steps covering a ±1.84 mrad range, corresponding
to lateral displacement of ±48 mm at L1. Figure 2 shows the
normalized detection efficiency in all four receiver channels
as a function of (φ,θ ). Most of the original features are
still visible. However, outside the narrow central range of
angles close to φ = θ = 0, individual-channel efficiencies
vary independently. Also, the size and shape of the central
peak is significantly different between channels. This was
impossible to identify during the normal alignment procedure.
This effect can be attributed to imprecise focusing, optical path
length difference between the arms, off-centered alignment of
lenses, mode-dependent bending loss in fibers, and individual
variations in components. These may have also caused the
efficiency at one side of the outer ring to be higher. Because of
these reasons, there exist angles such that, if photons are sent at
those angles, one channel has a much higher click probability
than the rest.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
To emphasize the security threat, it is useful to model an
attack that exploits the discovered side channel. One possible
attack is the faked-state attack [30,40], which is an intercept-
and-resend attack in which Eve attempts to deterministically
control Bob’s basis choice and detection outcome. We model
a practical faked-state attack by using the data obtained and
the following assumptions: Alice and Bob perform the non-
decoy-state Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol using
polarization encoding. Alice emits weak coherent pulses
with mean photon number μ equal to the Alice–Bob line
transmittance [5]. Whenever Bob registers a multiple click,
he performs a squashing operation (double-click in one basis
is mapped to a random value in that basis, while multiple
clicks in different bases are discarded) [41–43]. Alice and
Bob also monitor total sifted key rate, and quantum bit
error ratio (QBER). Eve has information about Bob’s receiver
characteristics described above and only uses devices available
in today’s technology. She intercepts photons at the output
of Alice, using an active basis choice and superconducting
nanowire detectors, with overall detection efficiency ηe = 0.85
and dark-count probability <10−9 per bit slot [44]. Then, a part
of her situated close to Bob regenerates the measured signal
and sends it to Bob. We assume that Alice–Bob and Alice–
Eve fidelity F = 0.9831 [36], while Eve–Bob experimentally
measured F = 0.9904. Here fidelity refers to the probability
that a polarized photon will emerge from the PBS at the correct
path, which is related to visibility by F = (1 + visibility)/2.
We also confirmed experimentally that Eve–Bob fidelity is
preserved at all illumination angles shown in Fig. 2.
From Eve’s point of view, she wants to maximize the
detection probability when Bob measures in a compatible (i.e.,
same as her) basis to maximize Eve–Bob mutual information.
Also, she wants to minimize Bob’s detection probability in a
noncompatible basis, to minimize QBER. Let ηi(j ) be the
efficiency of Bob’s ith channel (i ∈ {h,v,d,a}) given that
incoming light is j ∈ {H,V,D,A} polarized. Thus, to find
attack points for the j th polarization, we choose angles that
have higher values of ηj (j ) and δj (j ) = min{ ηj (j )ηnc0(j ) ,
ηj (j )
ηnc1(j ) },
where ηnc0 and ηnc1 are the normalized efficiencies of the
two detectors in the noncompatible basis. Our experimental
attack angles are shown in the rightmost plot in Fig. 2. For
example, the H attack angles were composed of points for
which ηh(H ) > 0.2 and δh(H ) > 75. Similarly, for the V, D,
and A attack angles, ηv(V ) > 0.002, δV > 8; ηd (D) > 0.4,
δD > 80; ηa(A) > 0.1, δA > 20. The thresholds used here
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to find the attack angles were not optimal and were picked
manually.
To derive the key rate and QBER formula in Eve’s presence,
we start with a system with only Eve and Bob. Let us consider
Eve sending an H -polarized pulse to Bob within the attack
angles H. Before squashing, the raw click probability pi(j )
that detector i in Bob clicks given that Eve has sent j -polarized
light is
ph(H ) ≈ ch + 1 − exp
(
− μHFηh(H )
2
)
,
pv(H ) ≈ cv + 1 − exp
(
− μH (1 − F )ηv(H )
2
)
, (1)
pd(a)(H ) ≈ cd(a) + 1 − exp
(
− μHηd(a)(H )
4
)
,
where μH is Eve’s mean photon number and ci is Bob’s
background click probability per bit slot in ith channel. The
probability Phv(H ) that, after squashing Bob measures in the
HV basis, given that Eve has sent an H -polarized pulse, is
composed of three events: when only detector H clicks, when
only detector V clicks, or when both click. It can be written as
Phv(H ) = [1 − pd (H )][1 − pa(H )]
× [ph(H ) + pv(H ) − ph(H )pv(H )]. (2)
Let us now include Alice into the picture. Consider that Al-
ice sends an H -polarized pulse, and Eve intercepts it. Let P ec ≈
1
2 (1 − e−μFηe )e−μ(1−F )ηe and P ew ≈ 12e−μFηe (1 − e−μ(1−F )ηe )
be the probability that Eve measures in the compatible basis
(i.e., the same basis as Alice) and gets a click only in the correct
and wrong detector respectively. Let P enc ≈ 12 (1 − e−
μηe
2 )e− μηe2
be the probability that she measures in the noncompatible
basis (different basis than Alice’s) and gets a click in a single
detector. The sifted key rate given Alice has sent H -polarized
light is
Re(H ) ≈ P ec Phv(H ) + P ewPhv(V )
+P enc[Phv(D) + Phv(A)]
+ (1 − P ec − P ew − 2P enc)(ch + cv − chcv). (3)
An error can occur when Eve measures Alice’s signal in a
noncompatible basis or when Eve measures in a compatible
basis but Bob measures a wrong value owing to imperfect
fidelity or dark count. Hence, the error rate conditioned on
Alice sending H -polarized light is
EH ≈ P ec Pv(H ) + P ewPv(V ) + P enc[Pv(D) + Pv(A)]
+ (1 − P ec − P ew − 2P enc)
(
cv − cvch2
)
, (4)
where Pi(j ) is the probability that Bob measures the value i
after squashing, given that Eve has sent j -polarized light. For
example,
Pv(H ) =
[
pv(H ) − ph(H )pv(H )2
]
[1 − pd (H )][1 − pa(H )].
(5)
Sifted key rates and errors in Eve’s presence [Eqs. (3) and
(4)] conditioned on V , D, A polarizations sent by Alice can
be calculated similarly. The total sifted key rate and QBER in
Eve’s presence becomes
Re = 14
∑
j=H,V,D,A
Re(j ), QBERe =
1
4Re
∑
j=H,V,D,A
Ej .
(6)
The only free parameters left for Eve to manipulate are
the mean photon numbers of her signal. Knowing the angular
scanning data, Eve can use a numerical optimization to find
values of μH , μV , μD , μA that minimize QBERe while keeping
Re = Rab, where Rab is Bob’s sifted key rate without Eve. Our
numerical optimization achieves this for Alice–Bob channel
loss >3 dB if they are willing to accept a slight increase
of QBER by less than 0.7% (see Fig. 3). Here we assumed
Bob’s detector parameters as measured by us: efficiency at
φ = θ = 0 was 0.4 in all four channels, and individual detector
background count probabilities were in the range of 430 ×
10−9 to 1560 × 10−9 per 1 ns coincidence window. These
optimization results are realistic conditions for a successful
attack on most communication channels [14–17,19,20,22,36]
Note that the distance Eve–Bob can be increased without
affecting attack performance, by replacing Eve’s illumina-
tor with four collimators oriented at the required attack
angles.
We went further and imposed an additional constraint on
Eve to make Re(H ) = Re(V ) = Re(D) = Re(A) = Rab. Our
optimization shows that it is still possible for Eve to pick
appropriate mean photon numbers and successfully attack
the system with resultant QBER <6.82% in 3 − 15 dB line
loss range (Fig. 3). Similar QBER values are typical for
outdoor channels, because of background light. Eve could
shield Bob from the latter to hide QBER resulting from her
attack.
We would like to point out that the attack angles depend
on the way the setup is constructed, the imperfections of
each individual sample of component, and each individual
alignment procedure. In other words, no two setups are
identical, even if they are produced in the same assembly line,
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Modeled QBER observed by Bob versus
line loss. The dotted curve shows QBER without Eve. At lower line
loss, the QBER is due to imperfect fidelity, while at higher line loss
Bob’s detector background counts become the dominant contribution.
The lower solid curve (blue) shows QBERe under our attack when
only the total Bob’s sifted key rate Rab is matched. The upper solid
curve (red) additionally keeps his four channel rates equal.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Angular efficiency scan of the receiver after a 25-μm-diameter pinhole (Thorlabs P25S) is placed in the focal plane
of L1, L2 [Fig. 1(a)]. No detectable mismatch between channels was found under tight search conditions ηi(j ) > 0.001 and δi(j ) > 4.
and they will generally have different attack angles. However,
from a theoretical point of view, in quantum cryptography
it is assumed from Kerckhoffs’ principle [45] that, except
for the keys themselves, Eve has knowledge about all other
parameters in the system. It is thus a valid assumption
that she knows the attack angles. From a practical point of
view, Eve may try techniques proposed in Ref. [40]. She
may replace a small fraction of the signal states with faked
states at different spatial angles, then listen to the classical
communication to get an estimate of the efficiency of Bob’s
detectors at those angles. In this way she may gradually
improve her estimate on the mismatch without causing
excessive QBER. When she has enough information on the
statistics of the mismatch, she can launch her full-fledged
attack.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
In our attack, by sending lights at different angles, Eve
has broken a fundamental assumption of security proofs
that detection probabilities are independent of detection
basis [46,47]. We propose to restore this assumption by placing
a spatial filter (pinhole) at the focal plane of Bob’s L1 and
L2 [Fig. 1(a)]. Spatial filtering is sometimes done before the
beam splitters to increase signal-to-background ratio in the
channel [17,18,21]; however, it has not been characterized as
a security countermeasure. We performed scanning with 100-,
75-, and 25-μm-diameter pinholes and found that decreasing
the pinhole diameter gradually reduces the mismatch. The
25-μm-diameter pinhole eliminated any visible mismatch
(Fig. 4) even though we reduced our search parameters to
ηi(j ) > 0.001 and δi > 4. This pinhole provides Bob’s field
of view of 100 μrad, which does not reduce his efficiency with
turbulent atmospheric channels [19]. Hence, we conclude that
a 25 μm pinhole may be an efficient countermeasure for the
current setup.
Note that, in Refs. [29,48], a detector-scrambling strategy
was proposed that might be an effective countermeasure
against efficiency mismatch attacks for single-photon qubits.
However, it is not clear how effective that countermeasure
is, when one considers that the detectors operate on optical
modes, not on single-photon signals. This can be a future
study.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our analysis implies that data obtained during a QKD ses-
sion can be explained by an intercept-resend attack exploiting
the spatial mode side-channels. Therefore, there is no post-
processing or privacy amplification that can eliminate Eve’s
knowledge without sacrificing all keys [49]. Although our
practical attack should work, and the physical countermeasure
seems promising, there is still room for improvement on both
the attack scheme and countermeasures. Eve can employ more
attack angles or combine this attack with some other suitable
attack schemes, to increase the number of her free parameters.
Alice and Bob can make this harder by monitoring more
parameters. We expect that our attack can be conducted also in
the related decoy-state protocol [50], although the requirement
to match the correct decoy statistics will modify the parameter
regime where it will be effective. Another possible future
study is to fully implement the present attack under realistic
outdoor-channel conditions.
Note added. Recently, we became aware of a similar
work [35].
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Introduction. Recent studies show that free-space
quantum key distribution has an ability to distribute se-
cret keys over hundreds of kilometers above the ground.
In addition, with current technology it is the only chan-
nel that can be employed for quantum key distribution
on the global scale, via satellite-based systems. Although
QKD protocols and security analysis have been developed
in theory, deviation of the actual behavior of the devices
from the ideal behavior expected in theory presents a ma-
jor challenge in physical implementation. Thus, to guar-
antee the security, it is of utmost importance to scrutinize
the practical device behaviors for possible deviations, and
develop necessary countermeasures to any loophole that
can be exploited.
In this submission based on our recent preprint [1], we
focus on one such deviation inherent to free-space QKD
receivers. We experimentally characterize it, and propose
and characterize a countermeasure. We explore a viola-
tion of detection efficiency symmetry among all quantum
states in Bob’s receiver. If this violation exists, an adver-
sary Eve can send light to Bob in different spatial modes
so that one detector has a relatively higher probability of
click than the other detectors. In this way, she can ex-
ploit the mismatch in efficiency [2] and make Bob’s mea-
surement outcome dependent on his measurement basis
and correlated to Eve, which breaks the assumptions of
typical security proofs. In this work, we investigate how
crucial this can be to the security of QKD. (While finish-
ing our paper, we became aware of a recent similar work
[3].)
We study a receiver designed for polarization encod-
ing free-space QKD, described in the experiment section.
We begin by sending an attenuated laser beam to the
receiver with various angle offsets and recording the rel-
ative detection probability in each channel, to find inci-
dence angles with high efficiency mismatch. With these
data, we show by numerical modeling that an eavesdrop-
per attack exists that enables Eve to steal the secret key.
Lastly, we discuss a countermeasure.
Experiment. The receiver we test is a prototype for
a quantum communication satellite [4] with polarization
encoding. It is a passive basis choice receiver operating at
532 nm wavelength [Fig. 1(a,c)]. In this type of receiver,
the input light is split by a 50:50 beamsplitter BS and
polarizing beamsplitters PBS into four multimode fibers
leading to four single-photon detectors. The detectors
receive photons polarized horizontally H, vertically V,
+45◦ D and −45◦ A. In order to exploit the mismatch
in efficiency, Eve needs to know the efficiency of the four
detectors as a function of Bob’s input illumination an-
gle. Hence, our first step was to scan Bob’s receiver
for possible efficiency mismatch. Eve’s source consists
of a fiber-coupled 532 nm laser, attenuator A, polariza-
tion controller PC, and a collimating lens L4 mounted
on a two-axis motorised translation stage. In Fig. 1a,
green marginal rays denote the initial alignment from
Eve, replicating the alignment from Alice to Bob. As we
moved the stage in the transversal plane, it allows chang-
ing the beam’s incidence angle and lateral displacement
at Bob’s front lens L1 simultaneously. This is shown by
the red marginal rays in Fig. 1, representing a beam from
Eve coming at an angle (φ, θ) relative to the reference
beam.
At first, we did a preliminary scan using optical power
meters that revealed several features which should be
causes of efficiency mismatch, highlighted in Fig. 1(b).
Around φ = θ = 0, maximum light coupling resulted
in the central peak ¶. With increasing scanning an-
gle, the focused beam started missing the fiber core, and
the detector count dropped off ·. A region was found
when the beam reflected off the polished edge of PBS2
back into the fiber core, causing the peak ¸. Increas-
ing the angle further made the beam hit the anodized
aluminum mount of L1 and possibly edges of other lens
mounts and round elements in the optical assembly. It
was scattered at these edges, producing two ring-like fea-
tures¹. Beyond these features, there were no noticeable
power readings, as the beam completely missed the re-
ceiver aperture.
We then adjusted the receiver setup to minimize peak
¸, and performed final scans at 26.1 m distance using
Bob’s single-photon detectors. Before scanning, the op-
tics in Bob’s apparatus was aligned to maximize coupling
into all four detectors at normal incidence, which is the
standard alignment procedure for QKD. We then started
the scanning procedure that involved first, changing the
outgoing beam’s angle {φ, θ}, and then recording the cor-
responding count rate at all four detectors of Bob. Then
during post-processing, for each data point for each de-
tector, we subtracted the corresponding detector’s back-
ground count rate, and then normalized it by dividing by
the maximum count rate in that detector. The result is
shown in Fig. 2.
Attack model. We numerically model and optimize a
practical faked-state attack, using our experimental data
and the following assumptions. Alice and Bob perform
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FIG. 3. Modeled QBER observed by Bob versus line loss.
The dotted curve shows QBER without Eve. At lower line
loss, the QBER is due to imperfect fidelity, while at higher
line loss Bob’s detector background counts become the domi-
nant contribution. The lower solid curve (blue) shows QBERe
under our attack when only the total Bob’s sifted key rate Re
is matched. The upper solid curve (red) additionally keeps
his four channel rates equal.
non-decoy-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol
using polarization encoding. Eve intercepts and measures
every signals from Alice using an active basis choice re-
ceiver with high-efficiency single-photon detectors. For
each successful detection, Eve sends to Bob a faked-state
signal which is a weak coherent pulse with polarization
matching her measurement result. For each of the four
polarizations, she sends at a specific angle and mean pho-
ton number. Our next task is to find these parameters,
with the goal of Eve to maintain Bob’s detection rate and
minimize QBER.
Our experimental attack angles are shown in the right-
most plot in Fig. 2(a). For example, the H attack angles
were composed of points for which the probability of de-
tection in H channel was 75 times more than the other
two non-orthogonal channels (D and A), and the normal-
ized detection probability was at least 0.25. The thresh-
olds used here to find the attack angles were not opti-
mal, and were picked manually. With this information,
the detection rate and QBER of Bob can be calculated.
From these data, we then ran an optimization program
to find optimal mean photon numbers for each attack
angle. This optimization was conditioned to minimize
QBER and match the total detection rate expected by
Alice and Bob (calculated from the parameters at the
reference angle).
Our optimization shows that it is possible for Eve to
pick appropriate mean photon numbers and successfully
attack the system for Alice–Bob channel loss ≥ 3 dB if
they are willing to accept a slight increase of QBER by
less than 0.7% (see Fig. 3), if Alice and Bob monitor only
the total key rate. Furthermore, the attack is still suc-
cessful at QBER < 6.82% in 3–15 dB line loss range even
when Alice and Bob monitor the equality of detection
rates in each channel. Similar QBER values are typical
for outdoor channels, because of background light. Eve
could shield Bob from the latter to hide QBER resulting
from her attack.
Countermeasure. In our attack, Eve has broken
a fundamental assumption of security proofs: detection
probabilities are independent of detection basis. We pro-
pose to restore this assumption by placing a spatial filter
(pinhole) at the focal plane of Bob’s L1 and L2 [Fig. 1(a)].
We have tested several pinhole sizes, and found that
25 µm diameter pinhole eliminates any visible mismatch
as shown in Fig. 2(b). Hence, we conclude that a 25 µm
pinhole may be an efficient countermeasure for the cur-
rent setup.
Discussion and conclusion. Since our analysis im-
plies that data obtained during a QKD session can be
explained by an intercept-resend attack exploiting the
spatial mode side-channels, there is no postprocessing or
privacy amplification that can eliminate Eve’s knowledge
without sacrificing all key [5]. Although our practical at-
tack should work, and the physical countermeasure seems
promising, there is still room for improvement on both
the attack scheme and countermeasures. The effect of at-
mospheric turbulence on both scanning and signal trans-
mission needs to be studied. The resilience of pinhole
against laser damage needs to be tested. At last, all
these tests need to be performed again on the compact
receiver with integrate optics that is going to be installed
in the satellite.
Our study summarised here [1] is an excellent exam-
ple of deviation in device’s behavior that is not predicted
in theory but affects the security of the protocol. The
practical results of this study are applicable to most free-
space quantum communication systems. We hope that
this work will emphasise the necessity of investigating
physical side-channels in every implementation of QKD.
Iterations of finding vulnerabilities and testing counter-
measures should eventually guarantee the high level of
security promised by the theory of QKD.
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Quantum communication protocols such as quantum
cloud computing1, digital signatures2, coin-tossing3,
secret-sharing4, and key distribution5, using similar opti-
cal technologies, claim to provide unconditional security
guaranteed by quantum mechanics. Among these pro-
tocols, the security of quantum key distribution (QKD)
is most scrutinized and believed to be guaranteed as
long as implemented devices are properly characterized
and existing implementation loopholes are identified and
patched6,7. Here we show that this assumption is not true.
We experimentally demonstrate a class of attacks based
on laser damage8, capable of creating new security loop-
holes on-demand. We perform it on two different imple-
mentations of QKD and coin-tossing protocols, and create
new information leakage side-channels. Our results show
that quantum communication protocols cannot guarantee
security alone, but will always have to be supported by ad-
ditional technical countermeasures against laser damage.
Cryptography, an art of secure communication, has tra-
ditionally relied on either algorithmic or computational
complexity9. Even the most state-of-the-art classical crypto-
graphic schemes do not have a strict mathematical proof to
ascertain their security. With the advance of quantum comput-
ing, it may be a matter of time before the security of the most
widely used public-key cryptography protocols is broken10.
However, QKD (popularly known as quantum cryptography)5
allows remote key distribution with unconditional security6,7.
Its complete security model is based on the laws of quantum
mechanics, security proofs and model of equipment. When
we go from theory to practice, the practical behaviour of the
implemented equipment often deviates from its modeled be-
haviour, leading to a compromise of security11–16. However, it
is widely assumed that as long as these deviations are properly
characterized and security proofs are updated accordingly7,17,
QKD can provide unconditional security. In this work we
show that this is not always true for QKD and other secure
a)Electronic mail: makarov@vad1.com
quantum communication protocols. Even if a system is per-
fectly characterized and deviations are included into the secu-
rity proofs, an eavesdropper can still create a new deviation
on-demand, unlike in classical cryptography schemes.
The reason behind this is that in classical communication
systems, the security-critical parts can be physically separated
from the communication channel, thus making them isolated
from physical access and alteration by the eavesdropper18.
However, the front-end of a quantum communication system
is essentially an analog optical system connected to the chan-
nel, and easily accessible by an eavesdropper. The latter may
shoot a high-power laser from the communication channel to
damage a security-critical component of the system, render-
ing the system insecure8. To verify this possibility, we per-
form laser damage on two completely different widely used
implementations: a commercial fiber-optic system for QKD
and coin-tossing with phase-encoded qubits19,20, and a free-
space system for QKD with polarization-encoded qubits21.
In both systems, the damage opens up a new side-channel,
which can compromise the security of QKD even with today’s
technology16,22.
Although we have only tested implementations of QKD and
coin-tossing, the security of other quantum communication
protocols seems to rely on broadly similar assumptions, and
they use similar optical technology. For example, in quan-
tum cloud computing1 and digital signatures2, client’s and
Alice’s state preparation may be eavesdropped on. Quan-
tum implementations of oblivious transfer23 and relativistic
bit commitment24 are based on modified QKD setups and thus
suffer from the same vulnerabilities. However the implemen-
tations and security criteria of those protocols are less devel-
oped, making their battle-testing a future task.
Laser damage in fiber-optic quantum communication
system. To demonstrate the threat of laser damage in a fiber-
optic quantum communication implementation, we chose a
plug-and-play QKD19 and loss-tolerant quantum coin tossing
(QCT)3. Both were implemented using a commercial system
Clavis2 from ID Quantique20. In both cases, Bob sends bright
light pulses to Alice. Alice randomly encodes her secret bits
1
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
03
14
8v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
12
 O
ct 
20
15
Dpulse
Dsync
Dcw
C
on
tro
l e
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
Delay line
12.5 km
VOA2
VOA1
Photodetector
Avalanche
photodetector
Power
meter
Circulator
LaserVariable opticalattenuator (VOA)
Phase modulator
10%
90%
90%
10%
90%
10%
a
b
BobAlice
Eve Damaging
Fiber
beamsplitter
Fiber
connector
VOA3BPF
undamaged
Faraday
mirror
Bandpass
filter (BPF)
99%
1%
Damaging power at
Alice’s entrance (W)
Loss of photo-
sensitivity (dB)
none 1.0
1.6
1.5
5.5
1.7
completely lost
photosensitivity
0 50 μm
Bonding wire
Photosensitive area
FIG. 1. Attack on fiber-optic system Clavis2. a, Experimental setup. The system consists of Alice and Bob connected by a lossy fiber
communication channel (simulated by variable optical attenuator VOA3). Bob sends to Alice pairs of bright coherent optical pulses, produced
by his laser and two fiber arms of unequal length19,20. Alice uses fiber beamsplitters to divert parts of incoming pulse energy to monitoring
detector Dpulse, synchronization detector Dsync and line-loss measurement detector Dcw. She prepares quantum states by phase-modulating the
pulses, reflecting them at a Faraday mirror and attenuating to single-photon level with VOA1. Bob measures the quantum states by applying his
basis choice via phase modulator and detecting outcome of quantum interference with single-photon avalanche photodetectors. Eve’s damaging
laser is connected to the channel manually. BPF, bandpass filter. b, Pulse-energy-monitoring photodiode before and after damage. Brightfield
microphotographs show top-view of decapsulated photodiode chips. The last two samples have holes melted through their photosensitive area.
Scattered dark specks are debris from decapsulation.
by applying one out of four phases (0, pi2 , pi,
3pi
2 ), attenuates the
pulses and reflects them back to Bob (Fig. 1a). The security
of both protocols requires an upper bound on the mean photon
number µ coming out of Alice. Otherwise, an eavesdropper
Eve can perform a Trojan-horse attack25 by superimposing ex-
tra light to the bright pulses on their way to Alice from Bob.
If Alice is unaware of this and applies the same attenuation,
then light coming out of her has a higher µ than allowed by the
security proofs7, making the implementations insecure. It is
thus crucial for the security of both protocols that Alice moni-
tors the incoming pulse energy. This is achieved by employing
a pulse-energy-monitoring detector (Dpulse in Fig. 1a). A por-
tion of the incoming light is fed to Dpulse such that whenever
extra energy is injected, an alarm is produced22. The sensitiv-
ity of Dpulse is factory-calibrated, thus closing the side-channel
associated with the Trojan-horse attack.
We tested the endurance of this countermeasure against
laser damage. During normal QKD operation, we discon-
nected the fiber channel Alice–Bob temporarily and con-
nected Eve (Fig. 1a). She then injected 1550 nm laser light
from an erbium-doped fiber amplifier for 20–30 s, delivering
continuous-wave (c.w.) high power into Alice’s entrance. 44%
of this power reached the fiber-pigtailed InGaAs p-i-n photo-
diode Dpulse (JDSU EPM 605LL), and damaged it partially
or fully. It became either less sensitive to incoming light (by
1–6 dB after 0.5–1.5 W illumination at Alice’s entrance) or
completely insensitive (after ≥ 1.7 W). The physical damage
is shown in Fig. 1b. No other optical component was dam-
aged. We repeated the experiment with 6 photodiode samples.
In half of these trials, QKD continued uninterrupted after we
reconnected the channel back to Bob, as if nothing has hap-
pened. In the other half, a manual software restart was needed.
However, in all the trials the damage was sufficient to per-
manently open the system up to the Trojan-horse attack. As
modeled in Ref. 22, in the QKD protocol, Eve can eavesdrop
partial or full key using today’s best technology if the sensi-
tivity of Dpulse drops by more than 5.6 dB. In the QCT im-
plementation, a sensitivity reduction by 2.6 dB can increase
Bob’s cheating probability above a classical level, removing
any quantum advantage of coin-tossing. Laser damage thus
compromises both the QKD and QCT implementations. See
Methods for details.
Laser damage in free-space quantum communication
system. As a representative of free-space quantum communi-
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b, Spatial filter before and after damage. Darkfield microphotographs show front view of the pinhole. See Supplementary Video 1 for real-time
recording of laser damage to the pinhole inside Bob.
cation, we chose a long-distance satellite QKD prototype op-
erating at 532 nm wavelength21 employing Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol5. At each time slot, Alice randomly
sends one out of four polarizations: horizontal (H), vertical
(V), +45◦ (D), or −45◦ (A) using a phase-randomized at-
tenuated laser. Bob randomly measures in either horizontal-
vertical (HV) or diagonal-antidiagonal (DA) basis, using a
polarization-beamsplitter receiver (Fig. 2a). It has been shown
in Ref. 16 that an eavesdropper can, in practice, tilt the beam
going towards Bob by an angle (φ, θ) such that the beam
misses, partially or fully, the cores of fibers leading to three
detectors while being relatively well coupled into the core
leading to the fourth detector, as illustrated in Fig. 2a. This
happens because real-world optical alignments are inherently
imperfect and manufacturing precision is finite. By sending
light at different spatial angles, the eavesdropper can have
control over Bob’s basis and measurement outcome and steal
the key unnoticed14,16,26. This attack can be prevented by plac-
ing a spatial filter or ‘pinhole’ at the focal plane of lenses
L1 and L2, as shown in Fig. 2a16. Since the pinhole limits
the field of view, any light entering at a higher spatial angle
is blocked and Eve no longer has access to the target angles
required to have control over Bob. As was demonstrated in
Ref. 16, a pinhole of 25 µm diameter eliminates this side-
channel by making the angular efficiency dependence identi-
cal between the four detectors (Fig. 3a).
We tested the endurance of this countermeasure against
laser damage. From a distance of 26.1 m, we shot an 810 nm
collimated laser beam delivering a 10 s pulse of 3.6 W c.w.
power at the pinhole inside Bob’s setup. The intensity there
was sufficient to melt the material (13 µm thick stainless steel)
and enlarge the hole diameter to ≈ 150 µm. The state of
the pinhole before and after damage is shown in Fig. 2b, and
the damage process in real time is shown in Supplementary
Video 1. Although Bob was up and running in photon count-
ing mode during the test, none of his other components were
damaged. See Methods for experimental details.
With this larger pinhole opening, it was again possible to
send light at angles that had relatively higher mismatches in
efficiency, as shown in Fig. 3b. This enabled a faked-state
attack under realistic conditions of channel loss in 1–15 dB
range with quantum bit error ratio (QBER)< 6.6% (see Meth-
ods). Thus laser damage completely neutralizes this counter-
measure, and makes this free-space QKD system insecure.
Discussion. The crucial step of the attack, creating the
loophole, has thus been experimentally demonstrated for both
systems tested. After this, building a complete eavesdropper
would be a realistic if time-consuming task27.
Countermeasures to the laser-damage attack may include a
passive optical power limiter28, a single-use ‘fuse’ that perma-
nently breaks the optical connection if a certain power is ex-
ceeded, or battery-powered active monitoring supplemented
with wavelength filtering. Hardware self-characterization
may be promising29, however to protect from an arbitrary
damage it must monitor a potentially large number of hard-
ware parameters. Any countermeasure must be tested in all
3
−1.84
−1.84 +1.840
+1.84
0
Attack angles
θ (mrad)
ϕ 
(m
ra
d)
ϕ θ−−
++
1
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-5
η
H V AD
1
10-2
10-4
η
ba V
−1.84
−1.84 +1.840
+1.84
0
θ (mrad)
ϕ 
(m
ra
d)
ϕ θ−−
++
1
10-2
10-4
η
10-4 H
V
D
A
�
�
�
�
FIG. 3. Efficiency-mismatch side-channel opened after laser damage in free-space QKD system. Each pair of 3D–2D plots shows
normalised photon detection efficiency η in a receiver channel versus illuminating beam angles φ and θ. a, Before laser damage, the angular
dependence is essentially identical between the four channels16. Plot for one channel (V) before damage is shown. b, After the laser damage,
the four receiver channels H, V, D, A exhibit unequal sensitivity to photons outside the middle area around φ = θ = 0. The last plot shows
angular ranges for targeting the four detectors that satisfy conditions for the faked-state attack.
possible illumination regimes. Eve can use a wide range of
wavelengths and optical pulse durations. Optical fiber trans-
mits wavelengths from ultraviolet to ∼ 2000 nm, while free-
space optics may also be transparent at longer wavelengths.
While we have demonstrated c.w. thermal laser damage on the
timescale of seconds, short-pulsed laser radiation may induce
different damage mechanisms30. Furthermore, systems can be
attacked in both powered and unpowered state (e.g., during an
outage or maintenance). By Kerckhoffs’ principle31, Eve is
assumed to predict and know the damage precisely. In prac-
tice when attacking installed systems, she may characterize
them by imaging, reflectometry25 and watching public com-
munication Alice–Bob while probing their response to attack
sporadically, adjusting her attack parameters until they enable
full eavesdropping26. In summary, construction of counter-
measures that guarantee security remains an open question.
In this work we have tested two QKD systems and a QCT
system against laser damage, and compromised the security
of each. Although we have not experimentally tested this,
it seems the security parameters, characteristics and assump-
tions of any other implementations of quantum communica-
tion protocols might also be vulnerable to laser damage. For
example, in a coherent-one-way QKD scheme32, the front-end
contains an attenuator, coupler, and monitoring p-i-n detec-
tor, all of which are potentially vulnerable. Similarly, there
is no guarantee that the measurement-device-independent33
and fully-device-independent34 QKD implementations cannot
be altered by laser damage (potentially breaking the assump-
tions of a trusted source in the former and the absence of
information-leakage channels in the latter). Any alteration of
characteristics might compromise the security either directly
by leading to an attack, or indirectly by shifting some parame-
ter in the security proof so it would no longer apply. Since the
laser damage is a new eavesdropping tool that alters a well-
characterized system, the community needs to think again
how to ascertain the security proofs against changing secu-
rity parameters. We expect that testing against optical attacks
including laser damage will become an obligatory part of se-
curity assurance for future quantum communications.
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METHODS
Laser-damage experiment on fiber-optic system. In our ex-
periment, we damaged Dpulse during QKD operation, trying
not to interrupt it. The system was allowed to start up and
produce a secret key for several QKD cycles, using BB84
protocol5. To perform laser damage, we disconnected the
channel for 2–3 min, giving us enough time to apply high
power to Alice, and then reconnected the channel. We tried
this at different points in the QKD operation cycle. Sometimes
the software recovered and resumed QKD, and sometimes it
got stuck in recalibration routines. In the latter case, a manual
software restart resumed QKD. Owing to a limited number of
trials, we did not perfect this timing aspect.
We tested a total of 6 photodiode samples. We damaged
each of them by applying high power laser light at Alice’s en-
trance. We then used the manufacturer’s factory-calibration
software to measure how much extra signal power (compared
to the pre-calibrated power level) could be injected without
triggering the alarm22. This quantified the reduction in sensi-
tivity due to the damage. Three samples were exposed twice
to a progressively higher power. For example, one sample was
first exposed to 0.5 W power at Alice’s entrance that reduced
its photosensitivity by 1 dB, then to 0.75 W power that re-
duced its photosensitivity by 6 dB. For the other two samples
these numbers were 0.75W with no change in sensitivity then
1.0 W, 1.6 dB (shown in 2nd microphotograph in Fig. 1b);
1.0 W, 5 dB then 1.5 W, 5.5 dB (shown in 3rd microphoto-
graph in Fig. 1b). For the remaining three samples, 1.7W was
applied at Alice’s entrance, and Dpulse completely lost photo-
sensitivity, becoming electrically either a large resistor (shown
in 4th microphotograph in Fig. 1b) or an open circuit. After
we were done with each sample, we used the same manufac-
turer’s factory-calibration software to pre-calibrate the sensi-
tivity of the next undamaged Dpulse sample, following the fac-
tory procedure.
No other component in Alice was damaged during these tri-
als. We also tested some components separately. FC/PC and
FC/APC optical connectors used in Alice and in the channel
withstood 3W c.w., while copies of Alice’s 10:90 fiber beam-
splitters (AFW Technologies FOSC-1-15-10-L-1-S-2) with-
stood up to 8 W c.w. with no damage.
Figure 4 summarizes a system operation log when it recov-
ered automatically after the damage that made the photodiode
an open-circuit with no photosensitivity. In the current sys-
tem implementation, this represents an ideal outcome for an
attacker.
For damaging and component tests, Eve used an erbium-
doped fiber amplifier seeded from a 1550.7 nm laser source
(EDFA; IPG Photonics ELR-70-1550-LP). She injected 0–
2 W c.w. power at Alice’s entrance. The injected power was
monitored with a 1:99 fiber beamsplitter tap and a power me-
ter (Fig. 1a). A manually operated shutter at the output of
EDFA allowed to ramp the power up and down smoothly be-
tween 0 and the target level, with tens of milliseconds tran-
sition time. The spectral characteristics of EDFA’s built-in
seed laser did not precisely match the passband of the BPF at
Alice’s entrance (1551.32–1552.12 nm passband at −0.5 dB
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FIG. 4. Fiber-optic QKD system operation during laser dam-
age. The plot shows accumulated secret key amount versus time.
Grey bands denote the system performing recalibration routines,
white bands denote the quantum bit sending and receiving, and blue
(darker) bands denote classical post-processing. All this information
was extracted from the QKD system log files after the experiment.
The band hatched in red denotes the time when the fiber channel
Alice–Bob was temporarily disconnected and the laser damage to
Alice was done by 1.7 W laser power, resulting in Dpulse becoming
an open circuit with no photosensitivity.
level, < 0.7 dB insertion loss; AFW Technologies BPF-
1551.72-2-B-1-1). We therefore removed the BPF for the
duration of experiment. The BPF was separately tested in-
passband using a different EDFA (PriTel LNHPFA-37) with a
narrowband seed laser, and passed more than 1 W c.w. with
no damage.
The system QKD software (‘QKD Sequence’ application20)
set the variable attenuator VOA2 at 2 dB. Thus, 44% of Al-
ice’s incoming light impinged Dpulse, while smaller fractions
impinged Dsync and Dcw. The alarm threshold of Dpulse is cal-
ibrated when the system is assembled at the factory, and is
not changed after that22. VOA3 introduced channel loss of
1.87 dB, to simulate the effect of≈9 km long fiber line Alice–
Bob.
The QKD system Clavis2 normally operates automatically
in cycles consisting of sending and receiving quantum states
until either the memory buffer is full or photon detection effi-
ciency has dropped significantly. It then uses the classical link
Alice–Bob to post-process the detected data and distill the se-
cret key11. Each cycle takes several minutes. If the last QKD
cycle was interrupted because the detection efficiency was too
low, or the key distillation failed, the system returns to start-
up routines such as timing recalibration35 before it resumes
sending quantum states. This happens often in normal op-
eration, because of naturally occurring drift of hardware and
channel parameters. The software generally tries to recover
automatically from various error conditions, to provide long-
term unattended operation36.
Predicted attacks on fiber-optic system with damaged
pulse-energy-monitoring photodiode. As modeled in
Ref. 22, for BB84 QKD protocol Eve can eavesdrop partial
or full key information using today’s best photonics technolo-
gies when the sensitivity of Dpulse has dropped by 4.3–5.6 dB,
given that communication channel loss Alice–Bob is in a 1–
7 dB range. (This corresponds to a multiplication factor x in
the range of 2.7–3.6, see Fig. 11 in Ref. 22.) If we assume
that Eve’s equipment is only limited by the laws of quantum
mechanics, then she can extract the full key information after
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only 0.4–0.8 dB reduction in sensitivity (x of 1.1–1.2). Simi-
larly, for QCT with a dishonest Bob only limited by the quan-
tum mechanics, all the quantum advantages of the protocol
are eliminated if sensitivity reduction of 2.6 dB is obtained in
Alice (x = 1.805), for a 15 km long communication channel.
For a 10 dB sensitivity reduction, Bob’s cheating probability
approaches unity22. Since we have surpassed the above sensi-
tivity reduction thresholds in our laser damage experiment, we
consider the security of both QKD and QCT implementation
compromised.
Laser-damage experiment on free-space QKD system. In
order to neutralize the effect of the pinhole and reproduce the
side-channel of spatial-mode detector-efficiency mismatch,
our experiment consisted of three steps. Firstly, we performed
scanning to certify that the system is secure against this side-
channel. Secondly, we laser-damaged the pinhole to open
the side-channel. Finally, we performed scanning again to
demonstrate that the system’s security has been compromised.
In all three steps, Eve was placed at a distance of 26.1 m away
from Bob and the steps were performed in sequence without
making any interactions with Bob.
The first step involved changing the outgoing beam’s angle
(φ, θ) emitted from Eve’s scanning setup shown in Fig. 2a,
then recording the corresponding count rate at all four detec-
tors in Bob. This step is identical to that in Ref. 16. The
scanning result is shown in Fig. 3a, where a pair of 3D–2D
plots shows the normalized photon detection efficiency in one
receiver channel versus the illuminating beam angles φ and
θ. With the pinhole in place, the angular dependence of ef-
ficiency is essentially identical between the four channels,
hence only a plot for channel V is shown. No measurable
amount of efficiency mismatch was found and no attack an-
gles existed16.
Then as the second step, Eve’s scanning setup was replaced
with the damaging setup. The latter contained a 810 nm
laser diode (Jenoptik JOLD-30-FC-12) pumped by a current-
stabilized power supply and connected to 200 µm core diam-
eter multimode fiber. It provided continuously adjustable 0 to
30 W c.w. power into the fiber. An almost-collimated free-
space beam was subsequently formed by a plano-convex lens
L5 (Thorlabs LA1131-B; Fig. 2a). The beam’s intensity was
nearly uniformly distributed across Bob’s L1 (50 mm diam-
eter achromatic doublet, Thorlabs AC508-250-A), with less
than ±10% intensity fluctuation across Bob’s input aperture.
Transmission of L1 was about 82%, owing to its antireflection
coating being designed for a different wavelength band. In
the test detailed here, the power delivered at the pinhole plane
was 3.6 W, sufficient to reliably produce a hole of ≈150 µm
diameter in less than 10 s in a standard stainless-steel foil pin-
hole (Thorlabs P25S). We also tested that power decreased to
2.0 W still produced a hole. No other component in Bob was
damaged during the tests. Bob’s lenses L4 received ∼ 1 µW
power each, and single-photon detectors only received on the
order of a few nW each, mainly owing to the presence of
BPF after the pinhole. The BPF was used by Bob to increase
the signal-to-noise ratio during QKD by heavily attenuating
all light outside the 531–533 nm passband (it consisted of
two stacked filters, Thorlabs FESH0700 followed by Semrock
LL01-532-12-5)21. While the damaging beam was on, the de-
tectors counted at their saturation rate of∼35MHz, which did
not look abnormal to Bob as this sometimes occurs naturally
owing to atmospheric conditions (during sunset, sunrise, fog).
We remark that this type of detector usually survives tens of
mW for a short time8,37. Even if we had to use a wavelength
within the BPF’s passband, detector exposure to higher power
could likely be avoided by shaping Eve’s damaging beam.
After the damage, as the third step we replaced the damag-
ing setup with the scanning setup again, and performed the fi-
nal scanning of Bob’s receiver with the damaged pinhole. The
results are shown in Fig. 3b. Now, the four receiver channels
H, V, D, A exhibited unequal sensitivity to photons outside the
middle area around φ = θ = 0. These efficiency plots were
different from those measured in Ref. 16 without the pinhole,
because of extra scattering at the edges of our laser-enlarged
pinhole.
Predicted attack on free-space QKD system with damaged
pinhole. We model a practical faked-state attack as described
in Ref. 16. We assume a part of Eve is situated outside Al-
ice and measures the quantum states coming out. Then, an-
other part of her regenerates the measured quantum states as
attenuated coherent pulses and sends them to Bob, tilting her
beam at an angle such that it has a relatively higher probabil-
ity of being detected by the desired detector. Eve has informa-
tion about Bob’s receiver characteristics after the laser dam-
age, and only uses devices available in today’s technology16.
For example, let’s assume Eve sends a horizontally polarized
light pulse. In this case, she should choose her tilt angle
(φ, θ) from a subset H˜ selected in such a way that the ef-
ficiency ηh(H˜) of Bob’s horizontal channel in H˜ is as high
as possible, in order to maximize mutual information Eve–
Bob. On the other hand, if Bob measures in the opposite
(DA) basis, the detection probabilities in the D and A chan-
nels ηd(H˜) and ηa(H˜) should be as low as possible, to min-
imize QBER. Thus, to find attack angles for the horizontally
polarized light, we choose H˜ that satisfies ηh(H˜) ≥ 0.6 and
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FIG. 5. Modeled QBER observed by Bob in free-space QKD sys-
tem. The dotted curve shows QBER without Eve. At lower channel
loss, the QBER is due to imperfect fidelity, while at higher channel
loss Bob’s detector background counts become the dominant contri-
bution. The lower solid curve (blue) shows QBER under our attack
when only Bob’s sifted key rate is kept the same as before the at-
tack. The upper solid curve (red) additionally keeps the same sifted
key rates conditioned on each polarization sent by Alice, which more
closely mimics a realistic system operation (see Ref. 16 for details).
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δ(H˜) = min
{
ηh(H˜)
ηd(H˜)
, ηh(H˜)
ηa(H˜)
}
≥ 100. Similarly, for V, D
and A polarized pulses, we choose attack angles that satisfy
ηv(V˜ ) ≥ 0.03, δ(V˜ ) ≥ 4.5; ηd(D˜) ≥ 0.6, δ(D˜) ≥ 120;
ηa(A˜) ≥ 0.2, δ(A˜) ≥ 22. These subsets of angles are shown
in the rightmost plot in Fig. 3b. Note that the thresholds η
and δ used here are not optimal and have been picked manu-
ally. However, they satisfy the required conditions to success-
fully perform the faked-state attack with a resultant QBER
≤ 6.6% in 1–15 dB channel loss range, as shown in Fig. 5.
In the simulation, we assumed that Alice–Bob and Alice–Eve
fidelity F = 0.983116,21, while Eve–Bob experimentally mea-
sured F = 0.9904. All other assumptions were the same as in
Ref. 16.
Additional considerations in experiment on fiber-optic
system. When we began testing the system components for
laser damage, the synchronization detector Dsync initially pre-
sented an obstacle. This detector was based on an optical
receiver module (Fujitsu FRM5W232BS) incorporating an
avalanche photodiode biased below breakdown at > 30 V,
providing an avalanche multiplication factor ≈6. It only took
about 6 mW of optical power at the photodiode (translating
to about 0.15 W at Alice’s entrance) to die. It stopped pro-
viding the synchronization signal for Alice and thus broke the
system. After an investigation, it turned out that the energy
that killed it was chiefly provided by its high-voltage electri-
cal bias circuit and not the optical signal. The bias circuit
was based on a specialised integrated circuit with overcurrent
protection (Maxim Integrated MAX1932ETC) followed by an
LC low-pass filter with inductor L = 330 µH and capacitor
C = 0.47 µF. If the optical power is applied suddenly, with
sub-nanosecond rise time, it momentarily induces a large pho-
tocurrent supplied from C that destroys the avalanche photo-
diode. If, however, the optical power is applied gradually,
with millisecond rise time, C discharges slowly and then the
relatively slow overcurrent protection reacts in the integrated
circuit, lowers the bias voltage and saves the photodiode. We
thus added a manual shutter to the EDFA to make the dam-
aging power rise from zero slowly, allowing Dsync to easily
withstand the optical power used in our attack while being
electrically powered up. Another solution could be to damage
the system when it is without electrical power. It can also be
said that we could choose to selectively damage one of two
components in Alice, albeit one of them bricking the system.
We ran our damage tests with VOA2 (OZ Optics DD-600-
11-1300/1550-9/125-S-40-3S3S-1-1-485:1-5-MC/IIC) set at
2 dB, because this is what the manufacturer’s QKD software
available for the research system Clavis2 set it at. The support
of the pulse-energy-monitoring countermeasure was not im-
plemented in this software22. In contrast, the manufacturer’s
factory-calibration software supported it fully and set VOA2
between 2 and≈15 dB, complementary to the channel loss, in
order to maintain constant power at the three Alice’s detectors
Dpulse, Dsync, and Dcw. The higher settings of VOA2 would
require more laser power to damage Dpulse. However, Dpulse
could also be damaged during the system start-up time, when
it sends the homing command to VOA2. The homing com-
mand causes it to traverse its lowest attenuation values for a
few seconds, likely being sufficient for Eve to do the damage
at already demonstrated power levels.
Supplementary Video 1. Real-time video recording
of laser damage to the spatial filter inside Bob’s
setup. Download the video at http://vad1.com/
pinhole-laser-damage-20140825.wmv (Win-
dows Media Video, 14.4 MiB) or http://vad1.com/
pinhole-laser-damage-20140825.ppsx (Power-
Point Show, 17.0 MiB). The video shows the spatial filter
(Thorlabs P20S) illuminated by 3.6 W c.w. 810 nm laser
beam for 10 s, focused in a spot much wider than the original
pinhole diameter of 20 µm. This is a filter sample with a
slightly smaller original pinhole diameter than the one used
to obtain efficiency mismatch data in this article and shown
in Fig. 2b. The samples were otherwise of the same type and
damaged under the same conditions. The video was taken via
a mirror lowered inside Bob’s setup. The pinhole plane was
imaged from the front side at an angle slightly off normal,
in order for the mirror not to obstruct the damaging beam.
Canon MP-E 65 mm lens was used at 2.8× magnification
and f/16 lens aperture (f/60 effective aperture), with Canon
EOS 7D camera body. The pinhole was brightly lit sideways
with a fiber-optic illuminator bundle, in order to bring up
detail. During the laser exposure, the steel foil can be seen
deforming from heat, popping out of focus and apparently
shifting laterally in the image; however the lateral shift is
an artefact of the camera’s angle of view being off-normal.
After the laser is switched off, the foil cools and returns to the
original position, now with about 150 µm diameter hole in it.
Sound was added later for an artistic effect.
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In this work, we investigate the finite key size effect on a commercial plug-and-play QKD system
Clavis2 from ID Quantuque. We demonstrated the ability of an eavesdropper to control the raw-key
size at Alice and Bob, and its effect on security analysis. We also investigated a countermeasure for
this effect.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key Distribution (QKD) system are expected
to provide highly secure keys between two parties. To
fulfill that expectation, every feature, imperfection, and
loophole both in theory and in physical implementation
have to be taken into account. One of these features
is that, with limited resource and time, a QKD system
can exchange a limited length of raw key. This results
in a deviation of statistical variables from what was pre-
dicted in the security proof. Finite key size analysis takes
those statistical deviation into account and modifies the
amount of the secret key generated after privacy amplifi-
cation process. This is done by introducing the security
parameter , which is the probability that non-zero secret
key has been generated according to the protocol but the
third party still got knowledge about this key.
The aim of this study is to emphasize the significance
of including the finite key analysis in the implementation
of QKD system, especially the commercial systems. We
demonstrate Eve’s ability to control the size of raw key
in a running commercial QKD system, and the effect on
security of secret key generated in the process.
QKD SYSTEM UNDER TEST
We studied a commercial plug-and-play QKD system,
Clavis2, by ID Quantique. This system was a fiber-
optics-based QKD system using phase-encoding scheme
and weak coherence pulse to exchange the secret key un-
der non-decoy-state BB84(a protocol introduced by C.
Bennet and G. Brassard in 1984) [1] and SARG(a pro-
tocol introduced by V. Scarani et.al. in 2004) [2] proto-
cols. The detail specification of the system can be seen in
[3, 4]. The security of this system is based on the security
analysis in [5] which didn’t considered the finite key-size
effect.
Alice Bob
Variable attenuator
FIG. 1. Scheme of experiment
EXPERIMENT
Under the normal operation, the system exchanged the
quantum signal and saves the raw key until the memory
buffers in Alice and Bob are filled. Then, they perform
sifting, error correction and privacy amplification. [3, 6].
One of the features of Clavis2 is that the system will ter-
minate the raw key exchange process when the photon
detection efficiency in quantum channel dropped below
a certain value, and perform the post-processing from
the raw key already exchanged until then. This feature
was implemented to compensate the drift of timing align-
ment of detector gates. Since the security proof of the
system did not take account the statistical deviation of
non-infinite key length, if Eve can force the system to
generate secret keys from a shorter raw key length, the
security proof would no longer apply.
To demonstrate the ability of Eve to force the system
to work with a small key length, we began our experiment
by setting the system in a normal operation. A variable
attenuator was inserted in between the quantum chan-
nel. The attenuator was set to 0dB at the beginning.
During the raw-key exchange phase, we let the system
exchange the raw-key for a set period then change the
value of the variable attenuator to induced a 40dB-loss
in the fiber. This reduce the detection efficiency in Bob
and forced the process to terminated and began the post-
processing. For all non-zero distilled key, we recorded the
length of sifted key, number of bits disclosed in the error
correction, error rate, and length of secret key reported
by the system. We varied the duration of each raw key
exchange to correct the parameter for various lengths of
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FIG. 2. Secret key rate vs raw key rate. Blue dashed line
is the infinite key bound. Red dotted line is finite-key size
bound with  = 10−10. Black line is finite-key size bound
with  = 10−1. Green dots are experimental result with 3 dB
line loss and 5.2% error rate.
sifted key. We found that the length off distilled key was
decreased as the length of sifted key decrease. Next step
is to verify if this data agree with the theoretical bound.
RESULT/DISCUSSION
We formulated the key rate equation based on GLLP
security proof [7] which gives the lower bound of secret
key rate under asymptotic assumption. For finite key
size effect, we used correction terms based on previous
analysis on BB84 system [8, 9]. Note that this equation
is the secret key length as a function of sifted key and
other system-reported-parameters.
l ≤ nA(1− h(E
A
))− leakEC
−1
2
√
(
ln(1/PE) ln(n+ 1)2)
n
−7
√
1
n
log(
2

))− 2log 1
PA
− log 2
EC
(1)
where n is sifted-key size, E is error per sifted key
reported by the system,leakEC = 1.2h(E) is the esti-
mated keys disclosed in error correction where h(E) is
Shannon limit of error correction. The correction term
A = (pdet−pmulti)pdet where pdet is the probability of detec-
tion and pmulti is the probability of multi-photon pulse
generated by Alice. The last four terms are the correction
terms due to finite key statistics [8, 9].
After substituting parameters from the experiment
into equation 1, we obtained a lower bound of secret key
length as shown in Fig.2. The blue line was calculated
under asymptotic assumption as used in the system’s pro-
tocol. The red and black line is the bound of secret key
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FIG. 3. Experiment result with the new software. Blue line
is the infinite key bound. Red-dotted line is finite-key size
bound with  = 10−10. Green stars are experiment results
rate under the finite-key size assumption (the area be-
low each line are secure zone correspond to the security
conditions applied to that plot). It can be seen from 2
that the experimental distilled key-size from the system,
green stars, satisfied the security criteria for asymptotic
assumption. However, the experiment result fall out of
bound of finite-key size analysis upto security parame-
ter  = 10−1. As a result, security of the system is not
covered by this security proof.
In the middle of our study, IDQ has released a new
patch for Clavis2. This patch reduced the QBER and let
the system perform post-processing only when the sifted
key in the memory exceed a threshold of around 1 million
bits. We perform our experiment and recalculated our
plot using the new parameters. The experiment distilled
is within the secure bound, Fig 3.
CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated the ability of Eve to control
the length of raw key in a commercial system, Clavis2,
and its effect against finite key analysis. We also investi-
gated the countermeasure from ID Quantique. We hope
that this study presented the significance of finite key
size analysis and why this effect should be included in
the implementations of QKD, especially for commercial
QKD systems.
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